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ABSTRACT 
The National Incident Management (NIMS) and Incident Command Systems (ICS) are 
important tools that can be adapted to establish command and control in coordinating 
some aspects of the response and recovery phases of many major incidents, including 
some types of terrorist attacks.  These command and control paradigms, however, are 
heavily reliant on communications technology and other social and organizational 
preconditions, and may fail to adequately support the initial law enforcement response to 
some types of incidents, such as the attacks that occurred in Mumbai, India and Lahore, 
Pakistan.  This thesis will suggest that recent developments in tactics employed by 
terrorists in India, Pakistan and elsewhere demand an urgent re-examination of the urban 
policing model currently employed in the United States.   
The American urban policing model is well suited for response to ordinary 
domestic criminal activity and, through the use of command and control tools such as 
NIMS, works adequately for many unusual occurrences. The NIMS-based model alone, 
however, including the current National Response Scenarios, seems ill suited for 
response to acts of paramilitary terrorism.  American law enforcement may require a 
supplemental response paradigm that envisions an effective initial response when faced 
with degraded communications capabilities and uncertain command and control 
structures.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The National Incident Management (NIMS) and Incident Command Systems 
(ICS) are important tools that can be adapted to establish command and control in 
coordinating some aspects of the response and recovery phases of many major incidents, 
including some types of terrorist attacks.  These command and control paradigms, 
however, are heavily reliant on communications technology and other social and 
organizational preconditions, and may fail to adequately support the initial law 
enforcement response to some types of incidents, such as the attacks that occurred in 
Mumbai, India, and Lahore, Pakistan.  This thesis will suggest that recent developments 
in tactics employed by terrorists in India, Pakistan and elsewhere demand an urgent re-
examination of the urban policing model currently employed in the United States (Kettl, 
2006; Los Angeles Police Department [LAPD], 2009; New York Police Department 
[NYPD], 2008; Overseas Security & Advisory Council [OSAC], 2008; Robb, 2007; 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs [SCHSGA], 2009; 
Sullivan & Elkus, 2009). The American urban policing model is well suited for response 
to ordinary domestic criminal activity and, through the use of command and control tools 
such as NIMS, works adequately for many unusual occurrences. The NIMS-based model 
alone, however, seems ill-suited for response to terrorist attacks such as have recently 
occurred in Mumbai, India, and Lahore, Pakistan.  American law enforcement may 
require a supplemental response paradigm that envisions an effective initial response 
when faced with degraded communications capabilities and uncertain command and 
control structures.   
NIMS/ ICS is a tool that is useful in managing some phases of the response to 
some incidents faced by law enforcement, but may not function well in the chaotic first 
phase of a law enforcement response to an extreme and novel event—such as an act of 
paramilitary terrorism. Donahue and Tuohy (2006) assert that first responders believe that 
“DHS mandates state and local governments to perform exercises they do not need” (p. 
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16). If first responders are performing the wrong exercises, then at best, they are doing 
the wrong things right.  We do not have the luxury of failing to prepare ourselves as 
thoroughly as possible for an effective, immediate response. As New York Police 
Department (NYPD) Commissioner Raymond Kelly observed, “by far the greatest 
numbers of casualties occur within the first five minutes” of an active-shooter type 
incident (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly section).  
At Columbine High School (1999), suicide pact actors Harris and Klebold shot at 
11 students within five minutes, killing two and injuring six (Rosegrant, 2001a). Eight 
years later at Virginia Tech, the kill rate accelerated dramatically when lone actor Seung 
Cho killed nine and injured three within 10 minutes before going on to kill 32 people 
(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).  Yet, these disturbed killers were highly inefficient 
as compared to the well-trained, highly determined paramilitary terrorists who attacked 
Mumbai.  An urgent question concerns the ability of the American policing model to 
respond effectively when confronting such well-planned, well-coordinated attacks on 
civilian populations. 
Tallen (2008) observed that the large body of increasingly sophisticated official 
doctrine that has appeared since 2001 “are quite consistent in ignoring modalities of terrorist 
attack other than WMD, isolated IEDs, and suicide terrorism” (p. 3). Both the National 
Response Framework (which includes NIMS) and the National Response Scenarios are 
designed for “consequence management,” and give no attention to “resolution of an ongoing 
terrorist incident,” “Nowhere in the National Planning Scenarios is there a requirement 
for a tactical response to resolve an ongoing situation or disrupt terrorist actions in 
progress” (Tallen, 2008, p. 3). Donahue and Tuohy (2006) emphasize the need to use 
valuable time and other resources to conduct realistic training that focuses on “lessons the 
field has identified” (p.16); I take their observation further, suggesting that planning, 
training, and exercising should also consider lessons the field has not yet identified, or 
which have been partially identified elsewhere, such as in Mumbai, India.  This thesis 
will explore these questions and the perception that NIMS alone, as currently designed, 
may not be the best strategy for all crisis types.1    
                                                 
1 The title of Tallen’s 2008 essay says it well: Paramilitary Terrorism, a Neglected Threat.. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature pertaining to the topics being explored in this thesis falls into four 
primary, overlapping categories.  First, there is the literature that pertains to the 
realization that a new type of threat is lurking on the horizon. Much of this literature has 
appeared in the wake of the horrifying November 2008 attacks against civilian targets in 
the Indian city of Mumbai.  This body of recent work is important to our discussion, 
because it is precisely this perceived shift in tactical emphasis among some terrorists that 
proclaims the rather urgent call for a reexamination of existing crisis response protocols.   
Second, there is the body of literature that questions the applicability of ICS to the 
range of crisis responses driven by law enforcement. This literature made its appearance 
relatively quickly following the development of ICS in California in the 1970s, but 
developed more during the 1990s. Its emphasis is sector-based, in that its core assertion 
challenges the effectiveness of NIMS/ ICS for use by law enforcement in general.  
Third, there is a scholarly body of literature, drawing on the work of E.L. 
Quarantelli and others, which questions the ability of NIMS/ ICS to function equally well 
across all crises and all work teams; both of which can exhibit considerable variability in 
terms of intensity, complexity, familiarity, social context, and group dynamics. Its 
emphasis can be seen as event-based because it focuses primarily on characteristics that 
are unique to certain types of events and to the people who must resolve them.  This 
literature is important to our discussion because NIMS—laid down by the federal 
government as the singular solution to crisis management in the decade since September 
11, 2001 (9-11)—fails to address the demands expected to be associated with a 
paramilitary terrorist threat (Tallen, 2008; U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
2003; DHS, 2004, HSPD-5, p. 3; Wenger, Quarantelli, & Dynes, 1990).   
Finally, there is the literature that deals with the possible response to our present 
dilemma.  There is a lack of information in this latter category, but what does exist is 
inspiring; for it reminds us of an undying spirit that exists in American pubic service that 
will not rest.  For example, Lieutenant John Sullivan of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department, writing for the West Point CTC Sentinel, courageously envisions a police 
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“operational art” in which small teams of police “move quickly through the city in a 
semi-autonomous manner” to engage and fix the enemy (Sullivan & Elkus, 2009, p. 6).  
Sullivan is alluding to what has become the focus of this thesis: the need in American 
policing for the development of initial response strategies that reduce the need for 
centralized command and control and awaken a renewed emphasis on small teams and 
front-line leadership.  In the sections that follow, I will summarize the literature in order 
to identify gaps, if they exist, and to synthesize the information in order develop the 
research questions to be explored in this thesis.  
1. Paramilitary Terrorism: A Neglected Threat To the Homeland? 
The November 26, 2008, terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India (26–11)2 served as a 
wake-up call for law enforcement agencies across the United States. Few had previously 
considered the possibility that Islamic terrorists might attack using readily accessible, 
conventional weapons, take hostages, and engage responding police officers (NYPD, 
2008, pp. 4, 48; Tallen, 2008).  For good reason, the dominant schema for a terror attack 
in the U.S. and abroad continued to feature suicide bombers and weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) (NYPD, 2008; Overseas Security Advisory Council [OSAC], 2008; 
Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2009, p. 6; SCHSGA, 2009a, SCHSGA, 
2009b). Between March 1993 and July 2006, 12 serious bombing attacks using 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) killed 516 people in Mumbai (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 4).  In its analysis of the Mumbai attacks the Overseas Security 
Advisory Council (OSAC) profiled 13 terrorist attacks occurring in India between March 
2003 and September 2008, all of which were bombings (2008, p. 15).  Thus, before 26–
11, “All other terrorist attacks in Mumbai city were by use of IEDs” (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 4).    
Despite the narrow focus brought about by the predominance of suicide terrorism 
and bombings, the warning signs had been present. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) launched its 
first attack in Kashmir in 1990 and has since extended its reach deep into the Indian 
                                                 
2 During the week of December 7, 2009, the author visited all attack sites in Mumbai, India and met 
with numerous Indian police officials and line personnel. The attacks of November 26, 2008, are 
commonly referred to in India as “26–11,” perhaps in reference to our own 9-11. 
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homeland. The group has reportedly maintained networks in Mumbai since 1999 and has 
been tied to multiple attacks and attempted attacks in the area (Fair, 2009). The Mumbai 
attacks epitomized the modus operandi (MO) displayed by LeT for at least 10 years. 
According to Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Foundation:  
…the attacks in Bombay3 reflect the LeT classic modus operandi:  Since 
1999, the group has used small but heavily armed and highly motivated 
two to four-man (sic) squads operating independently or in combination 
with others on suicidal—but not suicide—missions that are intended to 
inflict the largest numbers of casualties. (SCHSGA, 2009b, Tellis section, 
p. 6) 
The dangerous problem for Mumbai officials—and potentially for officials in the 
United States—was that these tactics had not, before 26–11, come home; leadership 
remained complacent.  After Mumbai, some recognized the danger and spoke out. 
New York Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Raymond Kelly said that 
the Mumbai attacks represented a “shift in tactics” (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly section, p. 
4), and that the attackers “displayed a sophisticated level of training, coordination, and 
stamina,” with shots “fired in groups of three aimed at head level,” “used hand signals to 
communicate across loud and crowded spaces,” and were “sufficiently disciplined to 
continue their attack over many hours” (p. 2). The March 3, 2009 attack targeting the Sri 
Lankan cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan served to fuel concerns.  The European Strategic 
Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC) described the Lahore attack as the second 
“urban jihad” (including Mumbai) in less than four months and stated that it “could be 
also a proof of the implementation of new terrorist tactics” (Interaction Systems 
Incorporated, 2009, p. 8). The Mumbai attacks resulted in the capture of a young 
Pakistani terrorist, and he provided information which shed more light on the nature and 
reality of the threat of paramilitary terrorism.  
Ajmal Amir Kasab was the only terrorist taken alive following the attacks in 
Mumbai and provided the Indian authorities with disturbing insights into the training of 
the attackers, their mindset, and their activities in advance of November 26, 2008 
                                                 
3 Mumbai was formerly known as “Bombay,” and some, even among Indians themselves, still prefer 
this name. 
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(NYPD, 2008; OSAC, 2008).  Kasab was trained by the LeT in camps “in Mansera and 
Muzzarafabad in Pakistani administered Kashmir,” where he (and presumably other 
attackers) “spent one year focusing on small arms tactics” and “close quarter fighting” 
(Government of India, 2009, p. 1; OSAC, 2008, p. 9).  If indeed paramilitary terrorism 
was to become a primary tactic in the service of global urban jihadism, then LeT, and 
presumably other groups, were clearly recruiting and training the soldiers for the urban 
jihad. 
Prior to Mumbai, many people persisted in imagining a future attack that would 
feature suicide and/or covert bomb attacks (NYPD, 2008; SCHSGA, 2009a, SCHSGA, 
2009b; Tallen, 2008).  The enemy, however, had other ideas, including multiple terrorists 
armed with assault rifles, military explosives, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
attacking civilians in public places. A few thinkers, like John Robb (2007), recognized 
the new threat even before the events in Mumbai. In his presciently entitled, The Coming 
Urban Terror, Robb clearly describes the vulnerabilities inherent to the urban 
environment.  Robb warned with frightening clarity of the “productivity growth that lets 
small groups terrorize at ever higher levels of death and disruption,” telling us that cities 
are both the most likely destinations of and points of origin for a lethal new breed of 
urban terrorist (p. 1).  Some may be tempted to think that that the American homeland is 
beyond the reach of the urban jihadists; the evidence proves otherwise. 
That terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and others maintain a 
presence in North and South America is well established in the terrorism literature 
(Bergen, 2008; Dyer, McCoy, Rodriguez, & Van Duyn, 2007; House Committee on 
International Relations, 2006).4 LeT, directly responsible for the attacks in Mumbai, may 
also have a presence in the U.S.  Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, has said that LeT operatives are known to be engaged in 
“fundraising far and wide, including in…the United States,” as well as in “the creation of 
sleeper cells for executing or supporting future terrorist acts in Europe, Australia, and 
likely the United States” (SCHSGA, 2009b, Tellis section, p. 5).  Clearly, there is 
                                                 
4 See specifically testimony of Dr. Eitan Azani, Christopher Hamilton, and Ilan Berman. 
 7
significant concern among various thinkers that the threat of low-tech paramilitary 
terrorism is a growing trend that could easily be exported into the United States.  We 
cannot afford to ignore the possibility that such an attack may occur in a U.S. city. 
2. NIMS/ICS: The Right Tool for Law Enforcement? 
Numerous sources document the birth of ICS out of late 1960s and early 1970s 
California wildfire fighting efforts (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006; Franco, Zumel, 
Holman, Blau, & Beutler, 2009; The National Response Team, n.d.; Wenger et al., 1990; 
Yates, 1999). ICS, a predecessor of NIMS, evolved from emergency response programs 
developed in the 1970s to manage the response to extensive California wildfires and is “a 
disaster management tool based on a series of rational bureaucratic principles” (Buck et 
al., 2006, p. 1).  Following a series of devastating wildfires resulting in significant loss of 
life and destruction of property, numerous deficiencies in the overall response to such 
events were identified, particularly when the response involved multiple agencies (Yates, 
1999).  ICS, and ultimately NIMS, became the solution. 
The federal government, in adopting ICS as part of the National Response 
Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System implicitly acknowledges 
that ICS has worked well in the firefighting arena. However, some social scientists and 
practitioners agree that ICS has been “less successful with law enforcement” (Buck et al., 
2006, p. 4; Howitt & Leonard, 2005; Wenger et al., 1990).  Klein (1999), in his work on 
decision making under stress, closely studied the California wildfire fighting arena from 
which ICS emerged.  Klein makes numerous observations regarding the characteristics of 
the core California leadership and management teams that ultimately invented ICS. For 
example Klein observed, “The people fighting forest fires have plenty of first hand 
experience…They are fighting an adversary that does not change tactics or add new 
weapons so the experience gained one year applies the next [emphasis added]” (1999, p. 
237). The originators of ICS were people who had worked side-by-side for years, 
repeatedly making similar tough decisions together. Proficiency among this group 
resulted from experience, stability of leadership talent and leadership networks and, 
critically, from the unchanging nature of the adversary they faced year after year (Klein, 
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1999, p. 237).  Klein noted that these factors are not present for military decision makers; 
neither are they, by and large, for those in law enforcement facing an extreme and novel 
threat executed by a sentient opponent. 
An interesting aside for further consideration is Klein’s conclusion that the very 
factors leading to the success of ICS within its originating work groups—stability of 
leadership, relationships, and networks—are unlikely to be present for many of the work 
groups on which the federal government now seeks to impose NIMS/ICS.  For example, 
during the Columbine High School shooting, Littleton Fire Chief William Pessemier 
attempted to establish a unified command (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 10). “We worked hard to 
integrate that operation,” said Pessemier, “but part of the problem was that I had never 
met” the police incident commander “before in my life;” “we didn’t have a real strong 
relationship with many of the law enforcement agencies in the local area” (Rosegrant, 
2001a, p. 10).  NIMS/ICS is represented as a command and control structure that can be 
readily implemented by ad hoc teams representing diverse sectors and organizations 
(DHS, 2003; DHS, 2004).  If as Klein asserts, this was not the nature of the environment 
from which ICS actually emerged, then the unquestioned assumption that NIMS/ICS is a 
ready-to-serve command solution for all inter-agency work teams may be flawed and is a 
question for future research. 
Howitt and Leonard (2005) highlighted the concerns with ICS and its application 
for law enforcement that are most relevant to our present focus on the emerging threat of 
paramilitary terrorism: “For firefighters, [N] IMS was a creative—even necessary— 
 
 
managerial invention…for law enforcement in the U.S., by contrast, the answer is less 
certain” (p. 41).  Buck et al. (2006), in summarizing the findings of Howitt and Leonard 
(2005), make a critical observation:  
ICS works for the fire services because they have been able to reduce the 
level of uncertainty in their disaster responses. This bodes poorly for large 
disasters which often involve...multiple hazards occurring in close 
 9
temporal and spatial succession…with multiple agent-generated 
demands.5 (p. 5) 
These types of problems were exemplified at Columbine High School, where 
“incident command seemed to have slipped” (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 14). Undersheriff 
John Dunaway and Lieutenant Dave Walcher, Jefferson County Sherriff’s Department, 
conceded to Rosegrant (2001a) that “the response did not meet a textbook case of 
incident command” and questioned “whether a more formalized structure would have 
been appropriate” (p. 14). The “fast evolving demands of the situation, the number of 
responding officers…argued against imposing a rigid structure under one lead agency” 
(Rosegrant, 2001a, pp. 14–15). Undersheriff Dunaway said, “I don’t think incident 
command was ever intended to be used for combat operations and that is basically what 
we were dealing with” (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 15). 
Buck et al. (2006) make a strong case that ICS, “now for the first time a full-
fledged federal bureaucracy,” is dependent upon the characteristics of the incident itself 
for success, as opposed to effective implementation of a command structure such as 
NIMS/ICS.  This suggests that the nature of the event is an important determinant of the 
applicability and success of NIMS, implying that the utility of NIMS/ICS is a variable 
whose value can be determined as function of the crisis type. They argue that ICS works 
when the crisis at hand is sufficiently “limited to allow an organized response to it, as 
well as to generate the sort of demands for which” first responders train (Buck et al., 
2006, pp. 16–17).  
Writing 16 years before Buck et al. (2006) and Wenger et al. (1990) offered an 
almost identical observation, noting frankly that the loss of communication, “conflicting 
directives, overlapping command, and confusion over decision making authority” they 
observed within ICS resulted not merely from poor planning or training but “from the 
problematical nature of disaster occasions themselves, the uncertainties and 
contingencies” inherent in crisis scenarios (p. 9). Some may argue that such observations 
recorded in 1990 are no longer relevant, but Donahue and Tuohy (2006), reviewing 
                                                 
5 Agent-generated demands are “specific to the situation and cannot be entirely anticipated” (Buck, 
Trainor & Aguirre, 2006, p. 3); see pages 12–13 of this thesis for discussion. 
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multiple disaster events, made similar observations (p. 6).  Thus, ICS, while perhaps well 
suited for managing the types of events for which it was originally developed, may not, in 
its present form, work well for all phases of all crisis types, such as the paramilitary 
attacks of 26–11 in Mumbai. 
The attacks on innocent citizens in Mumbai unfolded so rapidly that numerous 
persons were already dead before a thought could be given to the establishment of 
command and control (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; Interaction Systems Incorporated, 
2009; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department [LVMPD], 2010; NYPD, 2008).6 
Using call logs obtained from the Mumbai Police, Kamte (2009) describes the chaos and 
confusion that prevailed as authorities attempted to make sense of the information that 
poured into the police control center.  From the time the attacks started until 0200, 
November 27, the Mumbai police control room was overwhelmed, receiving 4.5 calls per 
minute (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 10). Initially, Mumbai police could not grasp 
the situation facing their city. 
Due to the “sudden and enormity” of the tactics employed, the police thought 
there were far more attackers than were actually present (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, 
p. 10); “We thought there must have been 60 instead of only 10” (H. Roy, personal 
communication, December 8, 2009; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 48).7  There were 
five teams of two attackers in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, and each team initiated its 
attack on a different target commencing at approximately 2120 hours (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009). Adding to the chaos, bombs had been placed in two taxi cabs, and 
detonated at other locations in the city8 (LVMPD, 2010; NYPD, 2008; Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009). 
Meanwhile, without benefit of effective centralized command and control, regular 
police officers around the city were doing their best against attackers employing superior 
tactics and weaponry. As NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly correctly observed, in these 
                                                 
6 Even suicide pact and lone actor “active-shooters” in the U.S. have generated such immediate death 
tolls; see Rosegrant, 2001a, and Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007. 
7 The author visited Jt. Comm. Roy in Mumbai on December 8, 2009. 
8 Wadi Bunder at 2156 and Vile Parle at 2253 (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 10). 
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types of attacks, “by far the most casualties occur within the first five minutes” 
(SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly section, p. 4).  During the minutes between 2120 and 2200 
hours, most of the 166 people killed throughout Mumbai were likely already dead or 
dying as terrorist assault teams initiated simultaneous attacks against four locations 
throughout the city (LVMPD, 2010; NYPD, 2008; OSAC, 2008; Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009).  
The initial chaotic response to these types of events will precede establishment of 
centralized command and control, therefore, additional focus is needed on training and 
preparation to address this critical, “neglected” area (Tallen, 2008). HSPD-5, the 
National Response Plan, and the National Response Scenarios presume a terrorist threat 
that falls somewhere within the suicide-WMD terrorism realm, with a focus on 
prevention and consequence management. This has “left America ill prepared to respond 
quickly and effectively to a terrorist paramilitary attack, which may be far more likely” 
(Tallen, 2008, pp. 2–3). 
3. NIMS/ICS: The Right Tool for All Crisis Types? 
In summarizing the discussion to this point, it is clear that there is concern that 
U.S law enforcement is not yet fully prepared to respond to acts of paramilitary terrorism, 
particularly multiple, simultaneous attacks. Buck et al. (2006), in discussing the utility of 
NIMS to the realm of law enforcement, concluded that ICS works well when the crisis at 
hand is sufficiently “limited to allow an organized response to it, as well as to generate 
the sort of demands for which” first responders’ train (pp. 16–17).  The concern is that a 
gap exists in the current modeling which must be filled in order to help prevent 
unnecessary loss of life in the event of a paramilitary attack in the U.S.  Such concerns 
may be seen by some as unjustified attacks against NIMS generally, but this reaction is 
not necessary. In this section, we will review a body of literature that provides insight 
into certain aspects of crisis events that makes them unique (just as a multiple, 
simultaneous, paramilitary attack scenario will be unique, quite different from anything 
experienced thus far in America) and which helps explain the need for innovation. 
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Hillyard (2000), in evaluating organizational response to crisis situations, 
identifies three variables which determine the “crisis typology” and thus the effectiveness 
of a given crisis response (p. 250).  The intensity of a crisis is increased when multiple 
problems are present in the same event; complexity refers to the number of public safety 
sectors involved in the response; familiarity—which applies most directly to our 
problem—refers to the frequency of occurrence of an event type; that is, to the level of 
experience first responders have in responding to the particular crisis.  Thus, an event that 
is low in intensity, low in complexity, and high in familiarity, is seen as the simplest type 
of crisis and the most likely to be quickly and effectively resolved.  Crises of low-
moderate intensity and complexity and high familiarity are the types of crises for which 
NIMS was designed; NIMS has worked well for these types of events in the past and may 
be expected to work well under these conditions in the future (Buck et al., 2006; Hillyard, 
2000).  
On the other hand, highly intense, highly complex and low familiarity crises are 
seen as extremely difficult to resolve and are considered to be “systems in chaos” 
(Hillyard, 2000, p. 251).  NIMS did not emerge as tool for managing systems in chaos 
and was not specifically designed for novel crises involving low familiarity with the 
event type.  Crises appearing on the extreme end of Hillyard’s spectrum are likely to be 
the least amenable to NIMS-based principles, particularly during the first critical hours of 
the response. Earlier scholars arrived at similar conclusions. 
Quarentelli (1999) identified two types of demands associated with major 
incidents: response-generated demands and agent-generated demands (Quarantelli, 1999, 
p. 3). Response-generated demands are “those created by the response to the disaster and 
are amenable to strategic planning;” agent-generated demands are “specific to the 
situation and cannot be entirely anticipated” (Quarantelli, 1999, p. 3). Quarentelli (1999) 
concluded that ICS is a good tool for managing response-generated demands but is less 
effective in addressing agent-generated issues.  The worst- case scenarios depicting 
paramilitary terrorism more closely conform to Quarentelli’s concept of less predictable, 
agent-generated demands (Giduck, 2005; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009).  In an effort to 
analyze the manner in which the response to crisis changes as a function of the changing 
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nature of the crisis itself, some authors have attempted to reduce crisis events to 
component phases or stages. 
Harrald (2006) conceptualized four stages in the response to “extreme events:” 
initial response, integration, production and demobilization and transition (pp. 260–261).  
The initial response “is conducted by resources on the ground reacting to the situation 
created by the event” (p. 260).  In an extreme and novel event, this is the phase during 
which we will likely encounter extreme versions of Quarantelli’s “agent-generated 
demands” and may face Hillyard’s “systems in chaos” (Quarantelli, 1999, p. 3; Hillyard, 
2000, p. 251).  Quarantelli (1999), in struggling to define the term “recovery,” found that 
the “general referent…is to part of what goes on in the post impact stage at some point 
after the crisis time period” of the disaster [emphasis added] (p. 2). Quarantelli thus 
implied the existence of an impact stage, which can be understood as approximating 
Harrald’s initial response phase for a given event. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
NIMS/ICS can be conceptualized as a variable that will be evolving and changing as a 
function of the evolving stage of a given crisis.   
The discussion so far in this review has emphasized a law enforcement 
perspective, which naturally focuses on the extreme front-end of the event continuum. 
Others, however, not specifically related to law enforcement, have observed that the 
usefulness of NIMS might began to wane later in the crisis continuum, before the 
conclusion of the long-term, post-crisis recovery phase. Since these observations also 
tend to suggest a more limited applicability of NIMS, and since they establish that 
challenges to NIMS are not limited to those advanced by the law enforcement 
community, we examine them here briefly.   
E.L. Quarantelli and Russell Dynes (1977), Ohio State University, provided a 
thorough review of available literature of the period pertaining to the complex social 
nature of disaster response.  They praised the research trends of the time, which were 
moving toward definitions of a “more social nature” and away from disaster research that 
had previously focused on purely physical issues (p. 24).  The authors identified an 
increasing interest among researchers in the social organizational features of disaster 
response, including a movement toward a focus on groups as opposed to individuals as 
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subjects of investigation and lauded what they perceived to be a greater focus on systems 
and related concepts. These foundational insights are important to us because they 
provide the platform from which later researchers would question the ability of 
NIMS/ICS to manage crises beyond the initial recovery phases of disaster response. 
Wenger et al. (1990), questioning universal applicability of ICS nearly 20 years 
before Mumbai, observed that “certain procedures and structures [ICS] have been 
advocated in an almost fad like way by well-meaning officials and vested interest groups 
in the emergency arena.” Furthermore, they recommended critical evaluation and 
empirical validation of ICS before the system should be advocated or implemented in 
“too many jurisdictions” (Wenger et al., 1990, p. 12). These authors asserted that the ICS 
“arrangement may be appropriate to purely or primarily fire suppression activities, such 
as wildfires. However, when other types of disasters occur that require a broad ranging 
response from a number of different organizations, ICS may work against coordination” 
(Wenger et al., 1990, p. 9).  Moreover, the authors argued that ICS is “particularly weak 
in effectively integrating the activities of relief agencies and volunteers,” which “were 
ignored” in the cases they studied (Wenger et al., 1990, p. 9). 
Quarantelli (1999), in later attempts to define what is meant by the term 
“recovery,” described it as the “post impact stage at some point after the crisis time 
period of the disaster” and wrote extensively regarding the role of informal networks and 
organizations, including families and volunteers. Quarantelli also touched on political 
considerations, which, he asserted, strongly affect the recovery process; one “would be 
naïve to think that…no political factors enter into the relevant decision making and the 
providing of recovery aid” (p. 9).    
Recently, Buck et al. (2006) summarized the rather extensive body of literature 
which describes the social complexities involved in disaster recovery, concluding that 
“NIMS ignores the evidence that disaster reconstruction, recovery, and mitigation are 
intensely social processes dominated by preexisting social power differentials and 
economic and political interests” (p. 18).  Donahue and Tuohy (2006), without attacking 
NIMS/ICS directly, arrive at similar conclusions. In their review of multiple disaster 
events occurring nationally, they describe organizations which refuse to coordinate, 
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cooperate and even “find themselves in competition” for scare recovery resources (p. 6). 
The emergency operations center (EOC), they assert as the “primary [ICS] mechanism 
for resolving resource-allocation struggles…is often ineffective” (p. 6). Thus, there is 
much in the literature to suggest that NIMS/ICS, as a structure, has been ineffective in 
coordinating the efforts of informal groups such as non-governmental organizations and 
volunteers, and furthermore, that the structural nature of NIMS/ICS teams may lead to a 
lack of authority and jurisdiction necessary to manage the deep processes of recovery 
through to completion.  
Wenger et al. (1990) had begun expressing concerns about ICS long before the 
events of 9-11 or 26–11.  They point out that ICS has been represented as a “cure-all” for 
all disaster situations and that “there are reasons to be skeptical of patent solutions” (p.8).  
Nearly 20 years later, Bellavita (2009) echoes those concerns, observing that the NIMS 
doctrine was “‘laid down as true’ in the early days of homeland security,” and “was the 
policy equivalent of finding any needle in a haystack, instead of looking for the sharpest 
needle” (Moody & Bellavita, 2009, Introduction).  This thesis suggests that NIMS is a 
good needle but is one which could be made sharper through informed debate. 
4. Supplementing NIMS: Filling the Gap 
Despite the recognition and articulation of a new type of terrorist threat, much of 
the national homeland security effort—at all levels—continues to proceed under the 
assumption that NIMS, with its focus on prevention and recovery, is the only necessary 
solution for an uncertain future (Tallen, 2008). Consequently, little has been written to 
call for redress.  In reality, there is no need to believe that NIMS/ICS must be abandoned 
in its entirety; on the contrary, there is every reason to believe that its usefulness in 
managing crisis consequence and recovery, especially when multiple-jurisdictions are 
involved, can continue to evolve and to improve.  The urgent need, however, is for 
discourse around the question of when and at what points in disaster response NIMS may 
be best applied, and what, if any, alternatives might be explored in order to fill existing 
gaps. 
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This thesis will focus on the extreme front-end of the continuum, the stage at 
which novel events arise and where the initial law enforcement response occurs; for it is 
here, during the sudden appearance of an extreme and novel event such as a paramilitary 
terrorist attack that the limits of centralized command and control, including 
communications technologies, will likely be exceeded. It appears that the window of 
opportunity for NIMS will begin sometime after commencement of the initial response 
phase.  If NIMS/ICS is unable to define or manage the nature and parameters of the 
initial law enforcement response to an extreme and novel event, or to stimulate the type 
of preparation and training that law enforcement (indeed, that all first responders) will 
require, then it follows that more than NIMS is needed.  It is the critical “more than 
NIMS” component of our equation that is has received the least attention thus far in the 
literature. 
In their Preventing Another Mumbai: Building a Police Operational Art, John 
Sullivan and Adam Elkus (2009) remind us that we have yet to learn the lessons of 
Mumbai, which center on “command and control failures” and slowness and 
disorganization of tactical response” (p. 4).  Sullivan and Elkus assert that these 
problems—for the police in Mumbai, and by implication, for police in the United 
States—were not simply the result of poorly trained or poorly equipped police forces. 
The problems, they argue, “are rooted in a central doctrinal flaw,” which they see as the 
inability of conventional urban police forces to envision and to manage more than a 
single tactical event at a time (p. 4).  Current urban policing models (yet uninformed by 
our growing awareness of a new threat) envision crisis response as involving “a series of 
tactical engagements,” rather than a “campaign” in which they must engage “multiple 
incidents in multiple locations over time” (p. 4).   
In fairness, Sullivan and Elkus (2009) point to other failures in these attacks, such 
as those in intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities; however, they ultimately 
emphasize the command and control failures that “allowed” the attack to succeed (p. 5).  
Most telling, however, is the fact that the solutions they recommend do not call for 
improving or strengthening NIMS/ICS or for other efforts aimed at strengthening existing 
command and control models.  Instead, they recognize the need for ordinary law 
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enforcement personnel to train to respond to such events in the absence of ubiquitous 
centralized command and control. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) would concur. 
The command and control doctrine of the USMC dismisses as invalid the pursuit 
of complete or “omnipotent” command and control, and accepts the reality that 
“commanders are not really in control” of widely dispersed often isolated resources (U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1996, p. 42). The “proper objective is not to be thoroughly and precisely 
in control” but to loosely influence field resources in a fashion that is “more akin to the 
willing cooperation of a basketball team” than to the “omnipotent direction of the chess 
player” (p. 42). Thus, “The aim is not to increase our capacity to perform command and 
control. It is not more command and control that we are after. Instead, we seek to 
decrease the amount of command and control that we need” (U.S. Marine Corps, 1996, p. 
110). Sullivan and Elkus (2009) correctly assess that “small teams must quickly move 
through the city in a semi-autonomous manner” to engage the threat (p. 6), reminding us 
of what it is law enforcement responders must do before centralized command and 
control structures can be established. The authors conclude that much of the initial work 
will be the responsibility of “ordinary police,” not specialized teams, who must be 
trained, as they have been in Europe and Israel, to provide “full-spectrum” policing 
(Sullivan and Elkus, 2009, p. 6).  “Ordinary police,” and not specialized tactical teams, 
will be required to “fix the threat in place,” since local police cannot, when people are 
dying, afford to await the arrival of “high quality special operations forces” (Giduck, 
2005, p. 361; Sullivan & Elkus, 2009, p. 6). Several important law enforcement leaders in 
the United States have initiated planning intended to fill this gap. 
New York Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Raymond Kelly testified 
that the Mumbai attacks represented a “shift in tactics” (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly section, 
p. 4); accordingly, the NYPD has played a leading role in adapting to the new threat.  
Echoing Sullivan and Elkus, Commissioner Kelly has said, “Part of the reason that 
members of Lashkar-e-Taiba were able to inflict severe casualties was that, for the most 
part, the local police did not engage them [emphasis added]” (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly 
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section, p. 4).9  Kelly recognized the urgent need for the NYPD to alter its most basic 
tactics in order to meet the new threat.  “Heavy weapons training” would occur “more 
widely among officers,” meaning that patrol officers, and not just specialized tactical 
units, would be trained (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly section, p. 4).  By December, 2008, 
NYPD “police recruits received basic instruction in three types of heavy weapons” 
(SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly section, p. 4).  Of critical importance is Kelly’s realization that 
“multiple simultaneous attacks such as those in Mumbai” would spread NYPD tactical 
teams “too thinly,” thus necessitating the need to develop new training and tactics for 
front line patrol officers (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly section, p. 4).  America’s largest urban 
police force had quickly realized that American tactical doctrine, which emphasizes 
reliance on specialized tactical teams, has its limitations. But this was not the first time in 
recent history that a fundamental American policing doctrine had been challenged. 
The long-standing doctrine of isolate, contain, and call SWAT was shattered 
following the 1999 shooting at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. There was 
sudden realization among police leaders and tacticians that the American urban policing 
model was doctrinally flawed; this resulted in a veritable watershed event in American 
policing. American police patrol forces would, under certain conditions, act immediately 
to engage “active” suspects. Shooters such as those involved in the Columbine incident, 
as well as in subsequent events reminiscent of Columbine, were dubbed by police tactical 
practitioners as “active shooters,” and it was apparent that American law enforcement 
would need to rapidly adapt its tactics in order to address this trendy and deadly new 
threat. 
“Active shooters” are assailants who are actively engaged in seeking out and 
firing on innocent victims, and the traditional American policing model (isolate, contain, 
and call SWAT) had proven indefensible in such cases.  Tactical experts such as Frank 
Borelli (2005) noted, “‘Surround and contain’ became the patrol doctrine norm” in 
American policing, observing that for Columbine style active shooter incidents, “the law 
                                                 
9 More accurately, due to systemic programmatic shortfalls, Mumbai police beat officers were unable 
to effectively engage the attackers; police officers did indeed engage the attackers, as evidenced by the fact 
17 Mumbai and Railway police officers were killed and 35 injured in the immediate fighting following the 
initiation of the attacks (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, Appendix 2). 
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enforcement community has had to evolve again to depend on patrol officers to take 
aggressive action to resolve deadly situations” (see also Sullivan & Elkus, 2009, p. 5).  
Police officers responding to such events could no longer be trained simply to isolate, 
contain and wait for SWAT.  
Fretz (2007a) has asserted, “There is an extreme urgency for patrol officers to 
know how to make entry and deal with these situations, rather than waiting and 
containing the scene in anticipation of SWAT’s arrival” (p. 2). Even in large urban areas 
with full time tactical teams, response times for such teams would result in additional 
casualties, some of which would inevitably occur as patrol officers, lacking sufficient 
weapons and training, stood by, unable to intervene (Rosegrant, 2001a). Armellino 
(2007) noted, “It becomes the duty of the first responder to interrupt this murderous 
plan…at the earliest possible moment” (p. 2).  The “original strategy of ‘contain, isolate, 
and negotiate’ fails in the active shooter situation. If you exist in a model that cannot 
work, you’ll have a disastrous ending” (Fretz, 2009b, p. 4). The specter of paramilitary 
terrorism added sudden emphasis to the problem, spurring NYPD Commissioner Ray 
Kelly to demand further changes at the NYPD. 
The NYPD was the first agency in America to take action to address flawed 
tactical doctrine, but it was not alone for long.  By the spring, 2009, Los Angeles Police 
(LAPD) Chief William Bratton, former chief of both Boston and the NYPD, introduced a 
major effort to innovate significant change in police response doctrines, which were 
clearly not seen as sufficient when set against the events of 26–11.  The Multi Assault 
Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) project is a highly ambitious, multi-
agency program specifically intended to counter the threat of paramilitary terrorism 
(LAPD, 2009).  In stating that “The MACTAC project also involves officers and 
supervisors with special weapons expertise, counter terrorism tactics experience and 
several military personnel who have recently returned from tours in the Middle East” 
(LAPD, 2009) Bratton explicitly acknowledged the inadequacies of current American 
urban policing doctrine (LAPD, 2009).  
Chief Bratton officially acknowledged that both the military, and more 
specifically, those who had served in the Middle East, had something to offer to an 
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anachronistic American urban policing model.  Bratton could not have made the point 
more clearly:  
…when a multiple assault event occurs, the Department will immediately 
switch from our community policing patrol-ready mind set to a rapid 
response-ready capability in a matter of minutes, not hours. We have 
learned from our New York counterparts and those across the globe that 
minutes save lives during such events. (LAPD, 2009)  
Clearly, when dealing with well-trained, highly determined paramilitary 
terrorists—urban jihadists—Chief Bratton believes American “community policing” is 
not the answer.  Where, we must ask, does American law enforcement go from here?       
C. RESEARCH QUESTION  
India’s High Level Enquiry Committee on 26–11 observed that “in general the 
Mumbai Police initially responded to multi-targeted attacks efficiently, but in a manner 
that they usually respond to a law and order situation [emphasis added]” (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 10).  This thesis seeks to explore the following primary question: 
Will it suffice for American first responders to simply respond in a manner that we 
“usually respond to a law and order situation” when faced with acts of paramilitary 
terrorism in the homeland? This question is investigated by examining several of its 
obvious corollaries: 
• Has the time come, yet again, for American first responders to seriously 




• Whether or not NIMS—or the federal government—has a role in helping 
to prepare U.S. first responders to confront the unimaginable challenges of 
an American version of Mumbai, Lahore or perhaps Beslan,10 is there a 
need for innovation at the local level?  
                                                 
10 On September 1, 2004, Middle School Number One, Beslan, North Ossetia, Russian Federation, 
was the focus of an overwhelming attack by Sunni Muslim Chechen separatists who took more than 1000 
people hostage and murdered nearly 200, many of them children, before being killed by Russian Special 
Forces (Giduck, 2005). 
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• How should first responders—law enforcement as well as fire and medical 
services—plan to respond when facing multiple Fidayeen (high-risk 
commandos) attacking multiple locations with unimaginable 
determination and ferocity?   
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology employed in this thesis is best described as a hybrid 
combination of policy analysis, case study, and grounded theory (Bardach, 2009; Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2005).  NIMS, the National Response Scenarios (NRS), and the policies of 
most local first responder agencies in the United States do not yet address the gap this 
thesis purports to identify.  This thesis asserts that first responder policy—at all levels of 
government—should begin to include an acknowledgement of the threat of paramilitary 
terrorism. Such policies, once crafted, should drive formulation of the training and tactics 
that first responders will need in order to respond safely, effectively and immediately 
should a Mumbai style attack be visited upon targets in the United States. Because the 
foregoing represents the primary assertions of this thesis, analyses of existing policy 
relating to issues including NIMS/ICS, law enforcement, fire, and medical response 
doctrine, as well as the doctrine and policies of the Indian government prior to the 
attacks in Mumbai, are included. 
The case study component is perhaps the most straight-forward.  The paramilitary 
attacks against the city of Mumbai in November 2008 have provided the impetus 
necessary to seriously engage a number of thinkers in the United States in examining 
current emergency response doctrine.  Thus, I have relied heavily upon my own firsthand 
observations of the locations targeted in the city of Mumbai, the operations of the  
 
Mumbai city police, the Maharashtra Railway police, and the Indian Police Services in 
gaining an intimate understanding of the events that thrust that great city, her people and 
the threat of global paramilitary terrorism to the fore.  
Many individuals within the police services of Mumbai, though quite restricted 
within the guarded bureaucracy of the Indian system, exercised impressive candor in 
sharing with me their experiences and observations about the attacks, the aftermath and 
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the future ramifications for urban law enforcement worldwide.  With their trust and 
assistance, I have been able to locate several obscure official documents produced by the 
Indian government; wherever possible, I have relied exclusively upon these and other 
documents to establish key facts surrounding the Mumbai attacks. 
Peering through the lens of the collective experiences and stories of Mumbai and 
her people, this thesis examines several mass shooting incidents that have occurred in the 
United States.  No attack approaching the scale of Mumbai has yet occurred in the U.S.; 
however, in examining incidents that have occurred this thesis attempts to identify 
problems and challenges that U.S. first responders may encounter in a future paramilitary 
attack scenario. Building on the experiences of Mumbai, and through examination of the 
observations and experiences of many in the U.S. who have participated in mass shooting 
events in our own homeland, this thesis attempts to extrapolate from some of the 
collective lessons learned as a result of these experiences.  
Finally, a primary methodological approach employed in this thesis has been to 
examine evolving social phenomena in an effort to suggest a future theoretical approach 
for application among the American first responder community. This type of practical 
approach, working from the ground up, is referred to as grounded theory, and its major 
approach is to “begin with the data and use them to develop a theory” (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005, p. 140).  In order to “use” data “to develop a theory,” one must necessarily subject 
data to interpretation. The interpretation of the data that is offered in this thesis is 
expected to be somewhat controversial.  
Deeply entrenched and closely held dogma often become indistinguishable from 
the disciplines, organizations and individuals identifying most closely with them. 
NIMS/ICS, SWAT and other traditional response paradigms, such as isolate, contain and 
call in law enforcement and tactical separation of fire-medical assets from law 
enforcement, represent such dogma. Any data—or interpretation thereof—that is seen as 
challenging the status quo can be expected to encounter resistance from those who 
believe that current doctrine is adequate and that little or no change is necessary. 
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The analytical process involved compiling significant quantities of data from a 
variety of sources. From the existing literature, I complied and collated information 
pertaining to the Mumbai attacks themselves, as well as to mass shooting incidents that 
have occurred throughout the United States. The literature is replete with scholarly 
analyses of crisis events from inception to aftermath, and I drew heavily upon such 
analyses as well as on the recorded observations, comments and existing interviews of 
numerous practitioners who were present during the various crises examined. In addition, 
my work as a senior operations commander for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department has provided almost unlimited opportunity for interaction and discussion of 
crisis response with a variety of experienced practitioners; these practitioners operate at 
all levels within many diverse organizations, including the Indian Police Service in 
Mumbai.  In a decidedly qualitative process, the information was collated and coded and 
common themes and patterns were identified. These common themes and patterns form 
the basis for the arguments advanced in this thesis. 
The overriding intent of this thesis has simply been to open the debate and 
encourage future study.  Future research design might focus on the innovative new efforts 
now underway11 to address the changing threat environment, and might seek to identify 
vulnerabilities and to suggest innovative new models—affecting command and control, 
first responder tactics, and inter-disciplinary tactical integration—which might help 
improve preparedness levels among the various disciplines within the U.S. first responder 
community.   
                                                 
11 Such as the Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) concept discussed 
later in this thesis; see pages 52–53 for a discussion of this innovative new response program.  
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II. PARAMILITARY TERRORISM: POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India can be seen as a wake-up 
call for law enforcement agencies in Mumbai and across the United States (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009; SCHSGA, 2009a,). Few had previously considered the possibility 
that Islamic terrorists might attack using readily accessible, conventional weapons, take 
hostages and engage responding police officers (NYPD, 2008, pp. 4, 48). As we will see, 
the dominant schema for a terror attack in Mumbai—and in the United States—had 
continued to feature suicide bombers and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  The 
failure of the Indian authorities to prepare for the type of attack carried out in Mumbai on 
26–11 exacted a heavy toll: 166 innocent persons were killed—including 17 Mumbai 
City and Railway Police officers—and historic landmarks were scarred and forever 
condemned to stand as monuments to those who lost their lives (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009).  If the United States is to avoid a similar fate, we must heed the 
lessons of Mumbai. 
B. THE NEW URBAN TERROR: STEALTH BOMBS OR FIDAYEEN?  
Neither India itself nor the city of Mumbai has been strangers to terror attacks. 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) launched its first attack in Kashmir in 1990 and has since 
extended its reach deep into the Indian homeland. The group has reportedly maintained 
networks in Mumbai since 1999, and has been tied to multiple attacks and attempted 
attacks in the area (Fair, 2009).  Between March 1993 and July 2006, 12 serious bombing 
attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had occurred in Mumbai killing 516 
persons; thus, before 26–11, “All other terrorist attacks in Mumbai city were by use of 
IEDs” (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 4).  In its analysis of the Mumbai attacks, the 
OSAC, 2008, profiled 13 terrorist attacks occurring in India between March 2003 and 
September 2008, all of which were bombings (p. 15).  But these data do not tell a 
complete story. The LeT has employed the same modus operandi (MO) for at least 10 
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years.  The dangerous problem for Mumbai officials—and potentially for us in the United 
States—was that these tactics had not come home before 26–11; leadership remained 
complacent.   
The absence of Fidayeen assaults in Mumbai City “had perhaps led to a police 
mindset of thinking only of stealth bomb attacks” (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 4).  
The “big incident” of November 26, 2008, which “created international sensation,” was 
“different in nature (“Fidayeen” attack) from all other incidents which were bomb attacks 
through time devices” (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 23).  Consequently, security 
measures in India before 26–11 had focused on reducing vulnerability to explosives 
(Rabasa et al., 2009, p. 6).  A similar mindset persists in the United States.  
Prior to Mumbai, American policing collectively envisioned a future attack that 
would employ suicide bombers, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) or 
WMD (NYPD, 2008; SCHSGA, 2009a, SCHSGA, 2009b; Tallen, 2008).  Even now, the 
National Response Plan and the National Response Framework “consistently profile the 
terrorist threat as a nexus of suicide terrorism and WMD,” thereby serving to perpetuate 
an emphasis on covert attacks featuring explosives (Tallen, 2008, p. 3).  The emergent 
paradigm envisions multiple terrorist teams armed with assault rifles, military explosives 
and IEDs attacking civilians in public places.  Such tactics are known as “swarming” and 
are becoming all too common among terrorist organizations worldwide (Arquilla, 2010).  
As General David Petraeus recently observed, attackers responsible for the 
January 2010 attacks in Kabul demonstrated “resilience and indeed a degree of 
sophistication” in executing “simultaneous attacks” against multiple targets (Shah, 2010, 
p. 1).  The LeT has already proven in Mumbai that insurgent activities create “fungible 
skills that will eventually disperse throughout the world” (Jenkins, Crenshaw, Schmid, 
Weinberg, Ganor, Gorriti, & Gunaratna, 2007, p. 12).  Arquilla (2010) describes Mumbai 
as “the clearest example” of the “gathering swarm.” Some police leaders in the United 
States also recognized the danger and spoke out. 
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New York Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Raymond Kelly 
acknowledged that the Mumbai attacks represented a “shift in tactics” and set the NYPD 
on a course to address the threat (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly, section, p. 1). Los Angeles 
Police Chief Bill Bratton said the LAPD is “developing doctrine to improve our readiness 
to respond to, and defend the City from attacks similar to that recently experienced in 
Mumbai” (LAPD, 2009). The European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center 
(ESISC) observed a pattern, referring to the March 3, 2009 attacks targeting the Sri 
Lankan cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan. The ESISC hailed Lahore as the second “urban 
jihad” (including Mumbai) in less than four months, asserting that it “could be also a 
proof of the implementation of new terrorist tactics” (Terrorism Open Source Intelligence 
Report [TOSIR], 2009, p. 8).  Clearly, the events in Mumbai served to generate a justified 
new interest among some important Western law enforcement leaders and tacticians, 
but—as the Indian Police Service learned—mere awareness can prove dangerously 
insufficient.  
Before 26–11, Mumbai police officials had considered the possibility of 
paramilitary assault and had attempted to implement programs intended to improve 
response capabilities for such incidents. In “the 1990s, Special Motor Cycle borne 
commandos” (sic) “were raised and trained” to prepare for a “response to terrorist strikes 
within the city;” these officers were trained in hostage rescue and in the use of special 
weapons, including the AK47 assault rifle (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 18).  As of 
“11/2/2000” the government had created 100 such “flying squads with two commandos 
each,” of which Mumbai had been “allotted 46” squads (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, 
p. 18).12  Furthermore, in 2003, Quick Response Teams (QRT), consisting of eight 
officers and 48 men,13 were formed and received commando training from both the state 
and federal governments (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, pp. 11, 49–50).  QRTs were 
                                                 
12 Mumbai police officials are members of the Indian Police Service (IPS), and are subordinate to the 
Director General of Police for the state, in this case, the state of Maharashtra.  The state government 
approves and regulates all local policing efforts, and had distributed “flying squads” to areas throughout 
Maharashtra. 
13 The officer corps of the IPS is distinct from line police personnel in much the same way the U.S. 
military officer corps is distinct from enlisted service members. 
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deployed in teams of one officer and 12 commandos, with a goal of responding to an 
incident within 10 to 40 minutes (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009).   
For various reasons, primarily a failure to recognize the importance of preparing 
for such attacks, these programs failed to play a significant role in confronting the 
attackers on 26–11 (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, pp.18, 49–50). Though on notice 
that such attacks were possible, the Indian “police mindset of thinking only of stealth 
bomb attacks” had resulted in a level of complacency that had allowed the state of 
readiness of these special teams to deteriorate (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 4).  In 
the U.S., we too are now on notice. As Arvada, Colorado, Police Chief Ron Sloan said 
after Columbine, “Once the unthinkable happens, then it’s not the unthinkable anymore” 
(Rosegrant, 2001b, p. 8). A number of terrorist incidents involving assailants using 
conventional weapons have either previously occurred or have been planned in the 
United States.  The planned attack on Fort Dix, New Jersey (2007) involved a “similar, 
low tech” tactic reminiscent of the Mumbai attacks (SCHSGA, 2009a, Collins section, p. 
5), and both the Columbine High School (1999) and Virginia Tech (2007) shooting 
incidents resulted in high death tolls14 exacted by assailants using conventional firearms 
(Rosegrant, 2001a; Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). An important difference, 
however, and one that demands our urgent consideration, is that the Mumbai terrorists 
were well-trained, well-armed, Islamist extremists, not the lone fanatic or teenage suicide 
pact actors seen previously in the United States (NYPD, 2008; SCHSGA, 2009a, 
SCHSGA, 2009b; TOSIR, 2009).  In his, The Coming Urban Terror, Robb (2007) draws 
further parallels and cautions us to steel our cities against inherent vulnerabilities to 
“small-group terror and violence” (p. 1).  The inability of the Indian authorities to predict 
and prepare for the coming storm would exact a high cost from the Indian people and 
their police services.  
                                                 
14 Fifteen and 32 deaths, respectively. 
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C. MUMBAI UNDER SIEGE: THE MULTIPLE, SIMULTANEOUS 
TERRORIST ATTACKS OF 26–11    
On November 22, 2008, Ajmal Amir Kasab and nine other young Pakistani 
paramilitaries left the Pakistani city of Karachi on a terrorist mission to attack Mumbai, 
India (Government of India, 2009, p. 4; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; NYPD, 2008). 
Kasab, 22 years old, would to be the only terrorist taken alive following the attacks and 
would provide the Indian authorities with disturbing insights into the training of the 
attackers, their collective mindset and their activities in advance of November 26, 2008 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; Overseas Security Advisory Council [OSAC], 2008; 
NYPD, 2008).  Kasab had been trained by Lashkar-e-Taiba in camps “in Mansera and 
Muzzarafabad in Pakistani administered Kashmir,” where he and other attackers “spent 
one year focusing on small arms tactics” and “close quarter fighting” (OSAC, 2008, p. 9; 
Government of India, 2009, p. 1).   
Kasab was originally one of 32 candidates trained in a variety of subjects focusing 
on the knowledge and use of firearms, ammunition, grenades and other explosives, 
assembly of IEDs, counter-interrogation and pain-tolerance (Government of India, 2009, 
p. 2).  Of the initial 32 candidates, 13 were selected for the operations in Mumbai; six 
however, were reportedly dispatched to Kashmir for undisclosed reasons, and three new 
members were introduced, bringing the group to its final configuration of five two-man 
teams (Government of India, 2009, p. 1).  Ismail Khan, 25, of Pakistan’s Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP), had been among the three newcomers, and became the 
mission leader (Government of India, 2009, p. 2).  All attackers were from Pakistan and 
ranged in age from 21 to 28; the median age was 23 (Government of India, 2009, p. 2).   
The group travelled at sea for several days, completing most of the trip aboard the 
hijacked MV Kuber, a fishing vessel of Indian registry and arrived at a point four nautical 
miles off the coast of Mumbai at 1600 hours, November 26, 2008 (Government of India, 
2009, p. 5). Khan communicated with handlers in Pakistan, after which they killed the 
Captain of the Kuber, Amar Singh Solanki; the teams waited for darkness, then boarded 
an eleven-man inflatable dinghy and set out for the coast, arriving at Badhwar Park, in 
South Mumbai, at approximately 2030 hours (Government of India, 2009, pp. 4–5). The 
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attacks unfolded on the evening of November 26 as five two-man teams deployed into the 
crowded streets of Mumbai and calmly made their way to various predetermined targets 
throughout the city (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; Government of India, 2009; Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department [LVMPD], 2010; NYPD, 2008).   
The first report to police on November 26, logged at 2150, was of gunfire at the 
Café Leopold; two of the five teams had been assigned to target the Taj Hotel and made 
their way to their area using different routes (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; 
Government of India, 2009). Between 2130 and 2140 hours, the terrorists known as Hafiz 
Arshad and “Naser” took a brief detour from their trip to the Taj and entered the Leopold 
Café (Government of India, 2009, p. 6; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009). Arshad and 
Naser threw at least one grenade and opened fire with automatic weapons, killing 10 and 
wounding many more within minutes (Government of India, 2009, p. 6). At 2150 hours, 
the attackers exited a side door into an alley and opened fire on several police officers 
who had rushed to the scene; police unit “Tourist 1 Mobile” reported by radio that 
“police driver was hit by bullet” (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 31). Chaos and panic 
were already overtaking the Mumbai police as Arshad and Naser made their way down 
the alley to the nearby Taj Hotel. 
Within a few minutes of the first shots at the Leopold, shots were being reported 
at the Taj. The terrorists known as “Shoaib” and “Javed” had entered the Taj through the 
main entrance at about 2138 hours (approximately the same time Arshad and Naser had 
attacked Leopold) and killed an estimated 20 people within “the first few minutes” of 
launching their assault (Government of India, 2009, p. 7).  Taj Hotel security staff later 
explained that a mob of people had “attempted to rush into the hotel in panic when they 
learnt of the Leopold firing;” in the resulting confusion, Shoaib and Javed had most likely 
simply blended in with the crowds and were able to enter the Taj unmolested (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 39). After attacking Café Leopold, Arshad and Naser quickly 
rendezvoused with Shoaib and Javed at the Taj, entering through a side entrance with 
access to numerous high-end retail shops; together the four made their way to the historic 
Heritage Taj tower, killing anyone they happened to encounter (Government of India, 
2009, p. 7; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 37).   
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By 2155 hours, four or five police officers armed with “one SLR, one .303” and 
their duty handguns had entered the Taj in hot pursuit of the attackers (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, pp.31–32, 36).  The two terrorist teams had already attained the 
advantage of high ground by climbing the “royal staircase” of Taj Heritage from which 
they could engage the approaching officers (p. 37). In the resulting gun battle, one of the 
suspects appeared to have been injured by police gunfire, and Police Constable Rahul 
Shinde was killed by AK47 gunfire (p. 37). The terrorists continued to fire and drop 
grenades on the officers, who, despite injuries and significant tactical disadvantages, 
continued to engage the attackers for some four and one-half hours until the arrival of a 
team of Marine Commandos at 0227 hours, on November 27 (Pradhan & Balachandran, 
2009, p. 37). 
From the time the attacks started until approximately 0200 hours on November 
27, the Mumbai police control room was overwhelmed, receiving 4.5 calls per minute 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 10). Initially, Mumbai police could not grasp the 
situation facing their city.  Due to the “sudden and enormity” of the tactics employed, the 
police thought there were far more attackers than were actually present (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 10). Additional Joint Commissioner of Police Himanshu Roy 
recalled, “We thought there must have been 60 instead of only 10” (personal 
communication, December 8, 2009; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 48).15  Numerous 
calls for assistance from officers in the field overwhelmed radio channels and rendered 
them virtually useless, forcing field officers to attempt communication with the control 
room using cell phones (p. 10).  
Meanwhile, similar events were unfolding at the Trident-Oberoi Hotel. At 
approximately 2155 hours, Police Inspector Bhagwat Kacharu Bansode, armed with only 
a revolver, entered the Trident in response to reports of explosions and gunfire that he 
had received at 2151 hours (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 39).  Upon entering the 
lobby, Bansode realized there had been a “big attack” (p. 39).  All of the killings on the 
first floors of the two towers had already occurred; bodies were laying in and around the 
                                                 
15 The author visited Jt. Comm. Roy in Mumbai on December 8, 2009. 
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lobby, several restaurants, and the systems room; IEDs left in the valet area outside 
Trident and near the Oberoi lobby would explode at 2215 and 2230 hours, respectively 
(pp. 39–40).  
Other officers arrived, and together, they made their way across a lengthy 
passageway leading to the Oberoi, encountering more dead bodies along the way.16  As 
they would do at all other primary attack locations, the attackers (identified as Abdur 
Rehman and “Fahadulla”) had acquired the high ground, in this case by ascending the 
Oberoi atrium, which is open to and overlooks the lobby below. From their vantage point, 
they continued to fire and drop grenades on officers. Local police continued to return fire 
and evacuate injured until the arrival of Naval Commandos at 0200 hours on November 
27 (pp. 40–41). Confusion and chaos reigned, both in the field and in the control room, as 
police personnel attempted to decipher the bizarre events which seemed to be consuming 
their city. 
Joint Commissioner of Police (Jt.CP), Law and Order, K.L. Prasad, notified at 
home at 2147 hours by a personal contact, suspected a “gang war;” Prasad called the 
control room and ordered additional units into South Mumbai (Pradhan & Balachandran, 
2009, p. 32).  Simultaneously, police officers and citizens were inundating the control 
room with reports of shots fired, explosions and injuries to officers and citizens at 
multiple, disparate locations throughout South Mumbai. Commissioner of Police, 
Additional Director General (Addl. DG) Hasan Gafoor, upon learning of the firing at 
Leopold, also “thought it was a gang war, but when he heard a bomb blast he knew it 
would be a terrorist strike” (p. 33). Still, neither Gafoor nor any of his men could fully 
grasp the scope of the attacks underway. 
At approximately 2120 or 2140 hours, Ajmal Kasab and his teammate had entered 
the Chhatrapati Shivaji train station (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009). Additional 
Director General of Police (ADG) Raj Khilnani, Chief of the Maharashtra State Railway 
Police, said, “The station was crowded with people—families—sprawled on the floor 
waiting for commuter trains to take them to places outside Mumbai” (R. Khilnani, 
                                                 
16 The Trident and Oberoi are separate towers, part of the same hotel complex; they are connected by a 
long narrow hallway.  
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personal communication, December 2009; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009).17  Kasab and 
his partner would have literally waded through a sea of people as they made their way to 
the public restrooms carrying a heavy burden of firearms and explosives.   
Incredibly, each attacker had been able to conceal and carry an AK-56 assault 
rifle (Chinese-made version of the Russian 7.62mm AK-47) with several hundred rounds 
of ammunition, hand grenades and “4-5 kg of greasy black RDX”18 explosives 
(Government of India, 2009, p. 10; LVMPD, 2010; NYPD, 2008; Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009).  The two men exited the restrooms and immediately lobbed hand 
grenades into the throngs of unsuspecting people; explosions were followed by the sound 
of automatic weapons as Kasab and his partner began firing on the terrified crowds 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009). Fifty-two people were killed almost immediately, and 
another 108 were injured inside the CST alone (LVMPD, 2010; NYPD, 2008; Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009).  
Between 2200 and 2225 hours, it had become clear that were serious problems at 
Nariman House, a Jewish center located in the Colaba Wadi section. The terrorist team of 
Babar Imran and “Nazir” had planted two IEDs of eight to 10kg of RDX each, one at a 
nearby gas station and another inside the building at the base of the staircase, and had 
commenced firing outside (Duraphe, 2009; Government of India, 2009, Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009). At 2200 hours, ACP Issaq Bagwan heard a large explosion coming 
from near the narrow passage on which Nariman House is located (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 34). Bagwan rushed to the scene and, arriving alone, discovered a 
large and growing crowd, one person dead outside and a narrow street filled with debris 
(p. 34).  Imran and Nazir had already attained the high ground and were dropping 
grenades from above; Bagwan acted immediately to cordon off the area and stop traffic. 
So began the long siege of Nariman House. 
 
                                                 
17 The author visited ADG Khilnani at Chhatrapati Station during the week of December 7, 2009. 
18 A nitramine; still considered to be an important military explosive (GlobalSecurity.org). 
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Chaos and confusion erupted violently upon the city of Mumbai; it seemed the 
sounds of gunfire and explosions were everywhere at once. At 2156 hours, an IED 
exploded in a taxi at Wadi Bunder; at 2215 hours an IED blew up in the valet at Trident-
Oberoi; at 2230 hours in the lobby of the same hotel and at 2253 hours, another IED 
destroyed a second taxi at Vile Parle (Duraphe, 2009; Government of India, 2009, 
Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009). None of the 10 attackers would attempt to negotiate 
surrender, and none would surrender voluntarily. It would be nearly 60 hours before the 
nightmarish scenario of 26–11 was ended by commandos of the Indian National Security 
Guards (NSG) commandos with the killing the last of the attackers inside the Taj Hotel 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 39). After the event was ended, it would be months 
before India—and the world—began to gain a true understanding of what had occurred in 
Mumbai.     
As New York Police Department (NYPD) Commissioner Raymond Kelly 
correctly observed, “by far the greatest numbers of casualties occur within the first five 
minutes” of an active-shooter type incident (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly section, p. 1).  
During the minutes between 2120 and 2200 hours, most of the 166 people killed 
throughout Mumbai were already dead or dying as each terrorist assault team initiated 
similar attacks at four primary locations throughout Mumbai (Brenner, 2009; LVMPD, 
2010; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; NYPD, 2008; OSAC, 2008). The Indian Police 
Service had failed to capitalize on available information and opportunities that may have 
helped prepare its forces to effectively intervene against the paramilitary assault tactics 
employed on 26–11.  We, in the United States, now in possession of critical, actionable 
information, have an opportunity to avoid a similar fate. 
D. HLEC ON 26–11: OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The problems identified by the High Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) and others span a 
broad spectrum of issues ranging from defects in police organizational structure, 
breakdowns in intelligence and information sharing and deficiencies in the overall 
capabilities of police first responders (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009).  In Mumbai on 
26–11, the immediate and inescapable responsibility for the initial response belonged to 
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the cops on the beat. In the future, whether the next attacks occur in India, in the United 
States or elsewhere, neighborhood police officers will again be the first to answer the 
call.  This fact was not lost on the HLEC, which, though impressed with the “speed and 
urgency with which the Mumbai police machinery, as a whole” reacted to “war-like 
planned terrorist” attacks on five different locations within the city, had serious concerns 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 5).     
Problems with the first response capabilities of the Mumbai police can be seen as 
falling into three primary categories: insufficient numbers of police officers; inadequate 
equipment and training and absence of locally-based specialized tactical response teams 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009).  The first two categories can be seen as a direct 
acknowledgement that police beat patrol officers bear the burden of the initial response to 
such events now and in the future. The third category is the result of the recognition by 
the HLEC that modern urban police forces maintain “their own” dedicated specialized 
tactical teams, since a “centrally set up force” (referring to the NSG based in Delhi) takes 
too long to respond (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 19).  While each of these issues 
has relevance for urban law enforcement in the United States and will be discussed at 
length, this thesis suggests that, as it pertains to numbers of officers, the American 
problem is of an entirely different nature. 
The HLEC observed that in Mumbai, too few police officers are available for 
“normal policing” (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 68).  Although ensuring adequate 
numbers of police patrol officers can be seen as part of a comprehensive solution to the 
threat of paramilitary terrorism (and crime in general, for that matter), merely increasing 
the numbers should not be seen as a panacea. In Mumbai, a glaring problem centers on 
having too few police patrol officers, with too few—and inadequate—weapons, and 
insufficient training in the use of firearms. Conversely, policing in the United States is 
collectively facing a series of different problems concerning numbers of first responders, 
one which the Indian Police Services cannot yet appreciate: that of an over convergence 
 
 
of personnel. The following chapters will address several issues, including that of over 
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convergence, each of which, taken in the context of the attacks against Mumbai, 
represents an urgent cause for concern. 
The attacks of 26–11 teach us that we must analyze and consider the current 
capabilities, strengths, weaknesses and expected role of initial emergency responders—
our first first responders—whom we will expect to aggressively confront similar 
incidents, should they occur in America.  Individual street cops in America are not so 
different from the individual beat cops in Mumbai, who suddenly found themselves 
tactically engaged with well-trained, well-armed paramilitary attackers.  This thesis will 
focus on the role of America’s first responders in the event we are faced with similar acts 
of paramilitary terrorism in our own homeland. 
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III. MITIGATING AN AMERICAN MUMBAI: LESSONS FOR 
AMERICA’S FIRST RESPONDERS 
On December 30, 2008, the government of the state of Maharashtra formed the 
High Level Enquiry Committee (HLEC) on 26–11 and appointed Ram Pradhan and V. 
Balachandran to lead the investigation into the response of the Mumbai Police (Pradhan 
& Balachandran, 2009).  The HLEC identified multiple systemic failures, including a 
“lack of overt and visible leadership in carrying out operations to face multi-targeted 
attacks” (p. 5), with an emphasis on “direct commando” attacks, which the committee 
stated “the Maharashtra police had not [previously] experienced” (p. 4).  Police officers 
in Mumbai put up stout resistance against the attackers but were overwhelmed, both by 
tactics and fire power; “in general the Mumbai Police initially responded to multi-
targeted attacks efficiently, but in a manner that they usually respond to a law and order 
situation” (p. 10).   
Responding as we usually respond when faced with an extreme and novel event 
like paramilitary terrorism will cost lives unnecessarily, whether in India or in the U.S.  
Thus, the first and most important lesson of Mumbai is about leadership. Homeland 
security leaders at all levels and in all disciplines must acknowledge that the threat to 
America posed by paramilitary terrorism is real. Another important role for leadership is 
to continually re-assess the operating environment and to stimulate discussion and debate 
around existing doctrine and strategy. Unquestioned assumptions surrounding the sacred 
triad of NIMS, numbers and SWAT teams provide a rich environment for further 
exploration and research. 
A. CRISIS RESPONSE IN AMERICA: NORTH HOLLYWOOD, 
CALIFORNIA, 1997 AND LITTLETON, COLORADO, 1999 
The best way to imagine what the American response to an incident like 26–11 
would be to consider relatively recent examples of responses to similar events that have 
occurred in the United States.  The problem is that there are no such examples.  The 
attacks of 26–11 were paramilitary style attacks targeting unarmed civilians; that is, they 
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were carried out by multiple teams of civilians organized to function like military units, 
and trained in the use of military small arms and explosives.19  Attacks involving this 
level of sophistication and coordination have yet to occur in the United States; still, 
examining the response to major shooting incidents that have occurred proves instructive.  
This brief analysis featuring the shooting incidents which occurred in North Hollywood, 
California (1997), and in Littleton, Colorado (Columbine High, 1999), will focus on two 
major problems facing America’s first first responders: over-convergence and lack of 
tactical-level integration of the police/ fire/ EMS response. The incidents at both North 
Hollywood and Columbine resulted in enormous law enforcement responses, and 
Columbine, in-particular, serves to illustrate the collective challenges faced by tactical-
level police, fire, and EMS responders.  
1. Over-Convergence of Law Enforcement Resources 
The 1997 North Hollywood “shootout” involved two highly determined, heavily 
armed, and well-trained bank robbery suspects in a gun battle with the Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) that lasted nearly one hour (CNN, 1997; Johnson, 1997; Lait, 
1998; Newton & Schuster, 1997; Schuster & Smith, 1997).  The LAPD, a heavily 
resourced law enforcement agency employing nearly 10,000 police officers (LAPD 
Online, n.d.), mounted a massive response to this event; estimates of the response range 
from 200 to 370 police officers (CNN, 1997; McCarthy, n.d.).  The event resulted in a 
“spectacular eruption of firepower” (Schuster & Smith, 1997, p. 1) that ultimately left the 
two suspects dead and 15 others, including 10 police officers, injured (CNN, 1997).  
LAPD Commander Scott LaChasse, credited for successfully managing the police 
response, described the incident as “absolute bedlam” (Newton &Schuster, 1997, p. 1).   
LaChasse, now Chief of the Burbank Police Department, in Burbank, California, 
acknowledges that he did not know “how many people were involved in the robbery, we 
didn’t know how many officers were wounded, or how many were responding” (Newton 
&Schuster, 1997, p. 2).  Describing the complexities of the event, LaChasse said, “There 
                                                 
19 Tallen (2008) uses “‘paramilitary terrorism’ to describe hostage-taking, asset seizure, siege, or 
assault when they are undertaken by sizable group of highly motivated individuals trained, organized, and 
equipped like an infantry or special operations unit but without the status or accountability of a state-
controlled military force.” I will employ this definition when using the term. 
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was no end in sight. We had to keep planning—is there another suspect? How do we deal 
with the perimeter? We don’t want a suspect to get out with all the civilians trying to 
leave the area” (Newton &Schuster, 1997, p. 3).  The challenges involved in managing a 
police response of this magnitude are staggering. LaChasse recalled, “People self-
responded from all over the city. We couldn’t know who they were or what frequencies 
they were on. We had to send runners out to try to identify them” (personal 
communication, February 9, 2010).  LaChasse was describing features that are common 
to the American police response to major urban violence: over-convergence of personnel 
overwhelming command and control mechanisms. 
Though separated by several years and thousands of miles, Commander LaChasse 
and his counterparts at Columbine would share a brotherhood born of the chaos created 
by extreme and novel crisis events.  Over-convergence of law enforcement was well 
documented at Columbine, which “drew roughly 170 fire and EMS, and nearly 1,000 law 
enforcement personnel” (United States Fire Administration [USFA], 1999, p. 38).  The 
chaos of extreme crisis, described by Commander LaChasse two years earlier as 
“absolute bedlam” (Newton & Schuster, 1997, p. 1), would be described in a similar 
fashion at Columbine by Chuck Burdick, Littleton Fire Department, who said the scene 
produced “absolute overload” (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 21). Burdick said he “got to the point 
where I didn’t hear anything. Not even gray noise—it was no noise at all. It was the 
strangest experience I ever had” (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 21). Littleton Battalion Chief Ray 
Rahne, also working the chaotic scene, said, “I don’t know where all these people are 
coming from. I didn’t call them;” Rahne later recalled that he “finally just started 
screaming, ‘Who’s in charge?’” (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 9).  
No one could answer the question. Rahne lamented, “We had no staging, we had 
no base…we were getting all these self-dispatched people coming to the scene” 
(Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 9). Within minutes following the initial report to police, important 
ingress and egress routes were becoming clogged with emergency vehicles; Police 
Captain Mark Campbell recalled, “This was only 15 minutes into it, and I’d never seen so 
many police cars in my life” (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 7). Incredibly, Campbell was forced to 
assign a SWAT team to contact drivers to move the vehicles and when this failed, to 
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physically lift the vehicles and move them out of the way (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 15). This 
overwhelming, unmanaged—and unmanageable—initial response produced many of the 
same problems faced by the LAPD at North Hollywood two years earlier.  
Fire, medical, and law enforcement personnel had limited ability to communicate 
with one-another, “and a rapid buildup of cell phone usage overwhelmed both the nearest 
tower and the dispatch center, thus hampering operations” (USFA, 1999, p. 34).  One 
hour into the crisis, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s communications center reported that it 
could not contact the Columbine command post “because both radio links and cellular 
phone lines were jammed;” in addition, the center had reached its capacity, was 
overloaded, and 911 calls were being routed to surrounding jurisdictions (Rosegrant, 
2001a, p. 16). For fire personnel alone at Columbine, “communication was hampered due 
to sheer volume of radio traffic” (USFA, 1999, p. 20). For police, “Radios and cell 
phones and everything were absolutely useless…they were so overwhelmed with the 
amount of traffic in the air (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 16). The problem of over-convergence 
complicates crisis response for all first responders, but is an especially pervasive problem 
for law enforcement.20  Thus, law enforcement will need to lead efforts to find a solution 
to the problem, which, as the USFA (1999) observed, is a serious factor “complicating 
and compromising access/egress, site safety and security, and mission activities” (p. 2). 
Law enforcement culture values independence over teamwork and is biased in 
favor of individual discretion and decision-making skills. This feeds a culture that 
“reinforces independent action over coordinated teamwork” (Templeton, 2005, p. 30) and 
creates a “‘solo’ characteristic” that “exists in stark contrast to firefighters who work in 
teams or in groups of teams” (Hagen, 2006, p. 17). The policing environment thus 
cultivates the ability of officers to work effectively as individual tacticians, which is a 
necessary feature for organizations which must widely disperse personnel to handle a 
diverse spectrum of calls for service, the overwhelming majority of which require the 
presence only one or two officers.  This model works well for most calls police officers 
handle during the course of a single shift; however, as we have seen, when called upon to 
                                                 
20 This is well illustrated in the Columbine incident, where 1000 police versus 170 fire/ EMS 
personnel responded (USFA, 1999, p. 38). 
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respond to major incidents requiring teamwork and coordination, quickly becomes 
unmanageable.  In a strictly Darwinian sense, highly specialized organisms which 
predominate in one environment can quickly become endangered when that environment 
undergoes sudden change (Dawkins, 1989). To survive, successful organisms adapt.  If 
the active-shooter phenomenon urgently signaled the development of important changes 
in our environment, what is the message to be conveyed within the threat of paramilitary 
terrorism?        
The massive responses generated by the North Hollywood and Columbine 
incidents were directed at single events each involving only two subjects. Given the 
enormity of the responses involved (assuming current LE response paradigms), response 
to multiple attacks would almost certainly have exceeded the capacity of local agencies in 
both cases.  As was very clearly demonstrated at North Hollywood and Columbine, the 
American urban policing model automatically generates a maximum response to extreme 
events using virtually all available resources. Such uncontrolled deployment of assets can 
be expected to seriously impede or preclude effective response to multiple event 
scenarios such as occurred in Mumbai. 
Information as to total numbers of area law enforcement assets unassigned during 
the North Hollywood and Columbine events is not available for publication, however, it 
is safe to assume that multiple, simultaneous responses at the levels involved would have 
been out of the question.  As Commander LaChasse stated, multiple attack scenarios 
would demand that commanders “would have to share resources” (personal 
communication, February 9, 2010).  Thus, had the LAPD faced multiple simultaneous 
attacks that day, many of the 200–370 LAPD officers who responded to North 
Hollywood would have been needed elsewhere.   
To facilitate resource sharing, says LaChasse, cops will have to learn that they 
“Don’t go right to the scene. Squads will have to be held back in ready reserve” (S. 
LaChasse, personal communication, February 9, 2010). This approach represents a 
radical shift of current police response paradigms, including those intended to confront 
active-shooter scenarios. Tactical innovations designed to improve police response to 
active shooter events say nothing about the possibility of multiple, simultaneous attacks,  
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and continue to ignore the problem of over convergence. When the time comes to 
confront an American Mumbai, such oversights can be expected to produce unimaginably 
destructive consequences. 
As we have demonstrated, when police forces commit the error of over-
convergence, assets can quickly become heavily concentrated and partially confined 
within relatively small areas. Assets thus deployed are dangerously vulnerable to 
secondary attack and are not immediately available for deployment elsewhere “in-
theater” (Sullivan & Elkus, 2009, p. 5). In American policing, over convergence does not 
represent an anomaly; unfortunately, it represents the rule rather than an exception. Two 
recent events in Las Vegas, Nevada further emphasize the frequency with which this 
critical problem continues to occur during the U.S. law enforcement response to major 
incidents. 
In 2006, a single individual barricaded inside a Las Vegas apartment and firing on 
arriving officers fully occupied 75 percent of all on-duty LVMPD field resources, not 
including two SWAT teams fully committed to the event,21 in 2010, a single shooter 
armed with only a shotgun generated a response fully consuming more than 60 percent of 
on-duty LVMPD field resources, as well as numerous untold numbers of law 
enforcement officers from other agencies (LVMPD, 2010). Another unfortunate example 
of this problem appeared on Thursday, February 25, 2010 when “about 200 officers from 
nearly a dozen agencies” responded to the tragic shooting death of two Fresno, 
California, area deputies; one witness told the Fresno Bee that “Everyone in the world 
showed up” (Fresno Bee, 2010).  The single gunman took his own life and was later 
found inside his mobile home.  Returning to North Hollywood, one is left to imagine the 
total numbers of LAPD area officers that responded to that incident and the proportion of 
on-duty assets the number represented; Commander LaChasse was never able to  
 
 
                                                 
21 This event was also a very good example of everything that can go wrong during police response to 
a major incident; radio channels were overwhelmed, preventing field commanders from establishing 
command and control; ingress/ egress routes were  choked to capacity creating significant response 
problems for critical personnel, etc. 
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determine the precise number (S. LaChasse, personal communication, February 9, 2010).  
In any event, over convergence represents a major obstacle to be overcome in policing in 
the United States.    
As Giduck (2005) has well documented, observers in other countries have thought 
about and commented on this particular American vulnerability. In the United States, an 
event such as occurred in Mumbai or Beslan would result in a massive law enforcement 
response; the problem is “that all of the focus would be on the school” (or other primary 
target location). Other countries, notably Russia and Israel, have recognized “that the 
most visible actions of the terrorists…represent merely one part of the terrorist operation” 
(p. 341).  Ten years later, Columbine High School, condemned, like various sites in 
Mumbai, to stand forever as a monument to the death of innocents, continues eerily to 
chant its mournful warning.  
Before the chaos erupted at Columbine High School, an explosion and brushfire 
were reported in a field three miles from the school (Rosegrant, 2001b, p. 3).  Suicide 
Pact actors Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, high school students, had set up a diversion 
intended to pull first responders away from the primary target of their planned assault, the 
high school itself. At 11:22am, Littleton Fire and Jefferson County Sheriff’s Departments 
dispatched units to an explosion and grassfire near Chatfield and Wadsworth, 
approximately three miles from the school; the person reporting stated that there was “a 
big ball of fire, now there is smoke” (USFA, 1999, p. 9). The diversion was a success in 
that it placed the Littleton Fire Department resources closest to Columbine “three times 
farther away from the high school than would have been the case if they had been in 
station” (USFA, 1999, p. 9).      
In the case of well-planned paramilitary terrorist attack, there are likely to be 
others involved who are not directly associated with the primary attack location, 
including those conducting surveillance, planning to execute secondary attacks against 
first responders, or preparing to execute additional simultaneous attacks on other targets 




as tactical units receive word of a terrorist assault, a number of the responding teams do 
not go anywhere near the site of the attack at all” (p. 341).  Precisely this mindset must 
become part of a new American doctrinal mantra.  
In summary, a primary problem facing law enforcement in the age of urban 
paramilitary terrorism involves finding ways to balance and manage the initial response 
to extreme and novel events; under conditions like those faced in Mumbai on 26–11, 
resources will become scarce very quickly. The new threat demands that American law 
enforcement cultivate a smarter, more disciplined culture of crisis response.  A related 
problem that cannot be fully overcome until the problem of over convergence is resolved 
involves an overreliance on specialized tactical teams.  Our first first responders will not 
always have the luxury of implementing the doctrine of isolate, contain, and call SWAT. 
Our approach to paramilitary terrorism will need to build on the lessons that have already 
been learned and implemented to address the problems presented by “active shooter” 
scenarios. 
2. Overreliance on Specialized Tactical Teams 
The traditional American policing model of isolate, contain, and call SWAT 
(Special Weapons and Tactical teams) has proven inadequate in confronting “active 
shooters” (assailants who are actively engaged in seeking out and firing on innocent 
victims).  Tactical experts such as Frank Borelli (2005), noted that “‘Surround and 
contain’ became the patrol doctrine norm” in American policing, observing that for 
Columbine style active shooter incidents, “the law enforcement community has had to 
evolve again to depend on patrol officers to take aggressive action to resolve deadly 
situations.”  Arapahoe County Sheriff Patrick Sullivan said the “attack on Columbine was 
a ‘wake-up’ call for law enforcement, spurring it to reduce its reliance on SWAT” 
(Rosegrant, 2001b, p. 7).  
Following Columbine, law enforcement was criticized—and sued—for being “too 
risk averse in the first minutes of the attack” (Rosegrant, 2001b, pp. 4–5). Critics began 
to suggest that, had the first arriving deputies pursued Harris and Klebold into the school 
immediately, the incident might have been ended sooner (p. 5). The immediate retort 
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from law enforcement was predictable. Rosegrant (2001b) reported her finding that, in 
the initial years following the incident, members of the law enforcement community 
“almost uniformly dismiss that contention” (p. 5). This collective denial was likely based 
on a range of factors, including emotional distress, denial, legal concerns, and an inability 
to envision, at that time, a different kind of response by patrol officers to such events. 
Has Columbine truly served as that “wake-up” call, or do we, 10 years later, remain in 
denial and irrationally attached to traditional tactical paradigms?  
As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, many people clearly recognize 
the implications of events such as Columbine and Mumbai, and are calling for redress. In 
Mitigating Mumbai, Burton and Stewart (2009) observed that American street cops 
“might be called upon to be the primary force to stop” paramilitary attackers operating in 
the U.S. (p. 4). The “standard police tactic of surrounding the attacker and waiting for the 
SWAT team to go in and engage the shooter was not effective” in confronting the active 
shooter phenomenon in the U.S., and it will not be, they reason, when confronting 
paramilitary terrorism (p. 4). Others are heralding the same message.  
Ron Borsch, whose “stopwatch of death” tracks the increasing kill rate at active 
shooter events in the U.S., asserts that “time is the key factor” and “more cops need to be 
ready to go in and take care of business” (Fretz, 2007a, p. 2). Armellino (2007) asserts 
that “it becomes the duty of the first responder to interrupt this murderous plan…at the 
earliest possible moment” and that “first responding patrol officers are likely the only 
people on scene early enough” to save lives in such cases (p. 2). Fretz (2007b), 
interviewing multiple police tactical experts, writes that “Columbine is ancient history” 
and that “law enforcement is once again at a watershed” in terms of countering a “new 
model” for the active shooter (pp. 1–2).  Chudwin notes that the “original strategy of 
‘contain, isolate, and negotiate’ fails in the active shooter situation. If you exist in a 
model that cannot work, you’ll have a disastrous ending” (Fretz, 2007b, p. 4). The 
doctrine of isolate-contain-call has proven unacceptable when innocent, defenseless 
persons may be dying a few feet away from responding officers.     
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The writers and thinkers quoted above are responding primarily to an increasing 
kill rate associated with active shooter events in the United States.  Kill rates in active 
shooter events in the U.S. have risen from a low of one-half attempts per minute at the 
Texas Tower incident (1966), to 2.1 at Columbine (1999), to 7.9 at Virginia Tech (2007) 
(Fretz, 2007a, p. 2). Various factors, such as publication of details of attacks, access to 
information about prior incidents, and access to more destructive weapons are likely to 
continue to drive-up casualty rates in these types of events.  However, such events, 
though increasingly deadly, continue to feature lone or suicide pact actors who are 
unlikely to achieve the destructive efficiency of paramilitary attackers as witnessed in 
Mumbai. 
The collective thesis that is increasingly put forward by American police tactical 
experts focuses on the critical need to insert police tacticians into active shooter situations 
as soon as possible in order to stop, disrupt, or fix the attackers in place, thus limiting 
their ability to kill. At incidents where immediate action has been taken by police, an 
argument can be made that lives have been saved.  In Red Lake, Minnesota, 2005, a 
“solo” officer entered a school with a rifle and shot an attacker who had killed seven and 
wounded seven; at Dawson College, Montreal, 2006, two officers who had been working 
nearby heard gunfire, entered immediately, and ended the event with one dead and 19 
wounded; in Salt Lake City, Utah, an off-duty officer armed with a handgun pinned down 
an active shooter in a mall until the arrival of on-duty officers, ending that event with five 
dead and four wounded (Fretz, 2007a, p. 3). 
A paradigm shift occurred in American policing which placed ordinary patrol 
officers at the forefront when confronted with active shooter scenarios; increasing kill 
rates have served to increase the pressure. Mumbai represents an active shooter scenario 
exponentially magnified beyond anything we have yet experienced in the United States, 
and demands further, broad-based re-evaluation of current doctrine.  SWAT teams will 
come; however, delays are inherent with specialized teams, and delays cost lives and 
provide attackers time to create a tactical advantage (Giduck, 2005; Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009; Sullivan & Elkus, 2009; Tallen, 2008).   
 47
Delays in dispatching specialized teams, whose members are typically off-duty 
and at a distance, will dictate that the first arriving officers act immediately. If we can 
“attack right away, taking away the terrorists opportunity to fortify their positions, then 
the presence of negotiators becomes inconsequential” (Giduck, 2005, p. 366). Mumbai 
and Beslan teach us that terrorists cannot be allowed the latitude or time they need to kill 
or to consolidate during the first precious minutes following their initial assault on our 
citizens.  
Our first first responders—patrol officers who will arrive within minutes of the 
first reports—will require the training, teamwork, and equipment necessary to fix terrorist 
elements in place, depriving them of critical momentum necessary to fully execute their 
plans, which may include booby trapping of access points, obtaining the high ground, and 
taking as many hostages as possible (Giduck, 2005; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; 
Sullivan & Elkus, 2009).  Responding patrol officers will have no alternative but to act 
quickly and decisively when confronted with paramilitary terrorism; a major challenge 
will be to create a team-oriented culture in policing, while simultaneously providing the 
training and equipment necessary for success.  
Preparing first responders to take immediate action when no other alternatives are 
available does not imply that SWAT teams have no role; SWAT teams will respond, but 
they too will face radical new challenges when confronting paramilitary terrorists.  The 
active shooter phenomenon in the United States had the effect of dramatically altering 
response paradigms for patrol officers; however, for SWAT teams, it was largely 
business as usual. There is no longer room for business as usual, even among our very 
best. Tallen (2008) observes that even the best local SWAT teams in the United States 
“would be challenged by the paradigm shift involved in confronting paramilitary 
terrorism” because training is currently focused on “high risk warrant service, active 
shooters, and barricaded suspects” (p. 5).  
Current tactics and procedures employed by urban SWAT teams are “dangerously 
incompatible with the requirements of combat against multiple, dedicated, heavily armed 
and fortified terrorists” (Tallen, 2008, p. 5). Therefore, SWAT team doctrine must be 
informed by and must change in response to what has occurred in both Mumbai and 
 48
Beslan, just as patrol response doctrine has been informed and changed by Columbine. 
SWAT teams confronting paramilitaries will be engaging in combat. They will encounter 
fierce resistance, possibly including booby traps and barricades, and hostages will be 
killed immediately once assault is initiated (Giduck, 2005). 
The Indian and Russian military commandos who ultimately assaulted terrorist 
positions in Mumbai and at Middle School Number 1, Beslan, did so under extreme 
combat conditions not yet experienced by civilian law enforcement tactical teams in the 
United States (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; Giduck, 2005).  When facing paramilitary 
terrorists, “unlike America’s tactical doctrine of never moving past an area until it is 
completely secured,” entry teams will need to move quickly past unsecured areas and 
“toward the sound of the battle or the known position of the terrorists” (Giduck, 2005, pp. 
155–156, 352).  This “reality” alone will demand significant adjustment to existing 
American tactical paradigms (Giduck, 2005, p. 156).  
Slowly and carefully securing rooms is a technique that evolved in the arena of 
civil policing and was designed to ensure the maximum safety of entry team members 
under specific circumstances. These techniques have worked well, especially when 
dealing with civil policing functions such as search warrant execution and barricaded 
suspects. Such techniques would have been dangerously out of place in Mumbai or 
Beslan, where a primary tactical objective was to incapacitate terrorists in order to 
preclude further killing. Rapid access to and removal of injured victims will also be of 
critical importance; at Columbine, where entry had been made after the killing had 
stopped and the suspects were already dead, “children and one teacher lay bleeding to 
death while SWAT teams painstakingly cleared and secured every part of a large school” 
(Giduck, 2005, p. 352; Rosegrant, 2001a; USFA, 1999).   
A number of lawsuits filed in the aftermath of the Columbine crisis—as well as 
“the most critical press coverage”—focused on the tragic fact that it took SWAT teams 
“two-and-a-half hours, once deployed” to locate injured teacher Dave Sanders 
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(Rosegrant, 2001b, p. 4), who died before being evacuated (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 27).22  
SWAT teams took even longer to reach the library, where many student victims were 
located with the shooters, who had been dead since before or shortly after the teams made 
entry (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 12).  The paradigm shift envisioned in this thesis also 
emphasizes the need for cross-disciplinary tactical integration of ad hoc entry teams in 
these types of crises, to include explosives experts.  The need for such integration was 
apparent and was called for in the wake of the Columbine incident, and was very clearly 
articulated among the list of lessons learned (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 8).  Eleven years later 
it appears that, throughout most of the country, emergency response remains stubbornly 
bifurcated for most of our first first responders.  
Finally, no large local agency has unlimited SWAT resources; there are limits to 
the numbers of teams that can be assembled and deployed to a single incident. Multiple 
assault scenarios, such as occurred in Mumbai, will likely exhaust the response capacities 
of specialized units. NYPD Commissioner Kelly said that multiple, simultaneous attacks 
would spread agency tactical resources “too thinly” and would challenge our ability to 
provide fresh and rested tactical specialists for events of long duration (SCHSGA, 2009a, 
Kelly section, p. 4). Some events, such as North Hollywood (1997) and Mumbai, have 
resulted in deployment of incomplete tactical teams and individual team members with 
less than complete equipment (CNN, 1997; Johnson, 1997; Lait, 1998; Newton & 
Schuster, 1997; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; Rosegrant, 2001a, pp. 2, 48; Schuster & 
Smith, 1997). As the HLEC noted, when specialized teams are broken up and deployed 
as smaller units, they “lose their punch” (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 12).   
                                                 
22 SWAT Teams at Columbine faced multiple, overwhelming hazards and competing demands inside 
the school; team leaders had to guide their people through a dangerous web later determined to contain 76 
explosive devices, including two large propane bombs, which had been placed inside the school 
(Rosegrant, 2001, pp. 29–30). Team leaders had every reason to believe that many of the devices they 
encountered could have been timed devices, set to explode at any second. SWAT teams felt compelled to 
search all areas they encountered because students and teachers had secreted themselves throughout the 
building, and needed to be located and removed immediately (p. 25). 
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B. REDEFINING POLICE COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FACE OF 
PARAMILITARY TERRORISM 
The traditional law enforcement focus on independent action and immediate self-
response of all available resources represents a dangerous vulnerability when faced with 
paramilitary terrorism, especially multiple, simultaneous assaults. Individual tacticians 
responding en masse do not constitute teams, and will have great difficulty forming a 
coordinated team effort unless team effort and response discipline have been ingrained as 
part of a new police culture. Team effort and response discipline will permit commanders 
to “reduce the amount of command and control that we need” (USMC, 1996, p. 110), and 
will free them from unrealistic expectations for imposing more command and control 
upon “systems in chaos” (Hillyard, 2000, p. 251). 
Extreme and novel events, such as multiple, simultaneous, paramilitary assaults, 
will introduce a rapidly evolving series of tremendous, unprecedented uncertainties. “The 
defining problem of command and control that overwhelms all others is the need to deal 
with uncertainty” (USMC, 1996, p. 54). Conversely, the defining problem for ICS, and 
later for NIMS, was the need to manage resources under relatively predictable crisis 
conditions (Buck et al., 2006; Donahue & Tuohy, 2006; Franco et al., 2009; Howitt & 
Leonard, 2005; Klein, 1999; Quarantelli, 1999; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Templeton, 
2005; Wenger et al., 1990; Yates, 1999). Thus the critical difference, as yet 
unacknowledged by NIMS, is the need for first responders to deal with uncertainty when 
faced with extreme and novel events. “Were it not for uncertainty, command and control 
would be a simple matter of managing resources,” in which case systems such NIMS, 
which were designed to manage resources and consequences, might suffice (USMC, 
1996, p. 54).  
As it is, however, tactical level police, as well as fire and medical personnel 
participating in the response to extreme and novel events will be forced to accept 
“uncertainty as a fact and learn to function in spite of it” (USMC, 1996, pp. 77, 110).  
Thus, there can be no moral or ethical alternative to aggressive pursuit of the means “to 
reduce the amount of command and control that we need” when planning for the 
combined response to such events.  Command and control cannot impose mechanistic 
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order upon inherently chaotic conditions, and should not seek to do so (USMC, 1996). 
Acknowledging this basic tenet, senior police commanders become free to focus efforts 
on the reasonable and proper purposes of command and control in such cases, which 
above all else, “should help generate tempo of action since we recognize that speed is a 
weapon” (USMC, 1996, p. 53).   
Based on our knowledge of global events, such as Beslan and Mumbai, combined 
with our own limited experiences in the homeland, we can agree that rapid, effective 
deployment of tactical resources saves lives and disrupts the execution of tactical plans 
by our adversaries.  
It follows that the business of establishing command and control should never be 
permitted to produce a degraded or sluggish tactical response, particularly when faced 
with active-shooter or paramilitary terror scenarios. 
C. THE FACES OF INNOVATION: AN AMERICAN ANSWER TO 
PARAMILITARY TERRORISM    
Shortly after the attacks in Mumbai, New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly 
recognized the urgent need for the NYPD to again alter its most basic tactics in order to 
meet the new threat (SCHGA, 2009a Kelly section).  “Heavy weapons training” would 
occur “more widely among officers,” meaning that patrol officers, and not just 
specialized tactical units, would be trained. By December, 2008, NYPD “police recruits 
received basic instruction in three types of heavy weapons” (SCHSGA, 2009a, Kelly 
section, p. 4).  Of critical importance is Kelly’s realization that “multiple simultaneous 
attacks such as those in Mumbai” would spread NYPD tactical teams “too thinly,” thus 
necessitating the need to develop new training and tactics for front line patrol officers 
(SCHGA, 2009a, Kelly section, p. 4).  America’s largest urban police force had quickly 
realized that American tactical doctrine, which emphasized reliance on specialized 
tactical teams, had its limitations.  
Within six months of the Mumbai attacks, Los Angeles Police (LAPD) Chief 
William Bratton began advocating a major effort to innovate major change in police 
response doctrines, which had adapted very slowly following the 1997 North Hollywood 
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shootout (LAPD, 2009).23  In championing Multi Assault Counter Terrorism Action 
Capabilities (MACTAC), an ambitious, regional program which seeks to train officers to 
intervene immediately against multiple, simultaneous, paramilitary terrorist attacks, the 
LAPD, along with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), the Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD), and many others in the Southwestern Region 
overtly acknowledged an urgent need for further innovation. The nation’s first first 
responders, those who would arrive almost immediately to confront an attack, would 
need retooling.     
The Multi Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) project is 
“developing doctrine to improve our readiness to respond to, and defend the City from 
attacks similar to that recently experienced in Mumbai” (LAPD, 2009). Though the 
acronym was coined under Chief Bratton, the concept is the product of the efforts of 
numerous police professionals from throughout the southern California and Nevada 
region.  MACTAC is continually evolving within the LAPD as well as within the 
LVMPD, and is largely a process of trial and error.  The monumental challenges that 
must be addressed include that of police over-convergence, as well as crafting a truly 
inter-disciplinary operational response to meet the threat of paramilitary terrorism. 
Training and exercises have already begun within the LVMPD and elsewhere, and new 
procedures are being crafted, tested, modified, and shared. 
One way that MACTAC will confront the problem of over-convergence is by 
identifying, in advance, those squads, officers, and supervisors that are authorized to 
leave their assigned geographical areas in order to respond to developing incidents. 
Unless requested, others will be required to remain in assigned areas to monitor “theater 
level” occurrences and incidents (Sullivan & Ellkus, 2009, p. 5), protect critical 
infrastructure, and, in some cases, respond to designated staging areas, where they would 
form small tactical deployment teams. Alluding to a paradigm shift away from an over-
reliance upon specialized tactical teams (SWAT) to address acts of paramilitary 
                                                 
23 Some believe that change is occurring too slowly even in Mumbai; see Magnier, 2009. 
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terrorism,24 Bratton observed, “I fully expect the MACTAC doctrine will include an 
expansion of our Urban Police Rifle program, (and) improve tactics allowing for a rapid 
response to react and neutralize simultaneous incidents” (LAPD, 2009). 
Tactics “allowing for a rapid response” will be critical to our success against 
attackers such as those seen in Mumbai, but tactical programs such as MACTAC will 
lean harder on line-level leadership than on centralized command and control.  Such 
programs showcase the immediate, rapid deployment of first responders with the twin 
goals of stopping the attacks and seizing the initiative. Police officers, and their partners 
in other disciplines, will, like Krulak’s Marines, often operate “‘far from the flagpole’ 
without the direct supervision of senior leadership,” and in responding to an extreme and 
novel event, such as paramilitary terrorism, will face a “bewildering array of challenges 
and threats” (Krulak, 1999, p. 16).  This is why “it is not more command and control that 
we are after. Instead, we seek to decrease the amount of command and control that we 
need.” (USMC, 1996, p. 110).  This type of discussion, which hints at greater 
militarization of domestic police forces, is sure to meet abundant opposition both inside 
as well as outside the emergency responder community. 
Nowhere will the ambivalence be stronger than among senior leaders in local law 
enforcement, many of whom were indoctrinated in and strongly support the principles of 
community oriented policing (COP).  Close partnerships among the police and their 
constituent communities have served American policing well, improving police-
community relations, and, in many cases, helping to reduce crime.25  While such staples 
of modern American policing cannot be compromised, neither can such principles 
function to blind us to the urgent need for the addition of innovative new tools. Even as 
the military seeks to train its forces to function skillfully in their evolving civil policing 
role in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. domestic police forces can and should learn 
from the experience of the military in combating paramilitary terrorism (Bolgiano, 2009; 
Freier, 2009; Mills, 1997). 
                                                 
24 See Tallen, 2008, for a discussion of this critical issue; see also Borelli, 2005, for background 
discussion of the evolution of “active-shooter” training in the U.S. 
25 For background and discussion of some of the various models of community policing, see 
Goldstein, 1990; Kelling & Coles, 1996; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990. 
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Policing has always demanded that its practitioners maintain a diverse set of skills 
ranging from effective communications and interpersonal skills on the one hand, to the 
rapid, effective deployment of deadly force when necessary and appropriate on the other. 
The active shooter phenomenon, and more recently, the threat of paramilitary terrorism in 
the homeland, will no less demand broad-ranging skill sets among police practitioners. In 
the words of former Boston, NYPD, and LAPD police Chief Bill Bratton, “when a 
multiple assault event occurs, the Department will immediately switch from our 
community policing patrol-ready mind set to a rapid response-ready capability in a matter 
of minutes” (LAPD, 2009). The challenge for police leadership will be to balance these 
seemingly competing demands to ensure that the “switch” doesn’t get stuck in one mode 
or the other. 
If programs like MACTAC can be standardized and developed on a national 
level, then American police forces can better prepare themselves to withstand the initial, 
horrifying impact of multiple, simultaneous, paramilitary attacks on public places, and 
“the sudden and enormity” of the tactics employed (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 
10). SWAT teams, re-tooled to combat the organized ferocity of paramilitary terrorism, 
will comprise the “extraordinary force” that will be brought to bear after the attack has 
been fixed in place using “ordinary force”, that is, “full spectrum patrol units capable of 
standing up to operational shock” (Sullivan & Elkus, 2009, p. 6).  Next, we turn to what 
must also be considered a top priority: consolidation of line—or tactical level—
operations with our fire and EMS partners. 
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IV. POLICE, FIRE, AND EMS: TOWARD A FULLY-
INTEGRATED TACTICAL RESPONSE TO PARAMILITARY 
TERRORISM  
A. POLICE, FIRE, AND MEDICAL: WORKING TOGETHER OR PULLING 
APART? 
The American police and fire services face an inherent disadvantage in the case of 
paramilitary terrorism: response remains bifurcated against a single, unified threat. In 
preparing its after-action report following the Columbine High School attack, the USFA 
(1999), now an entity located within with the DHS, argued for cross-disciplinary training 
among fire, medical, and law enforcement personnel. In stressing the need to develop 
“Joint operations and unified command between law enforcement and fire/EMS 
[emphasis added],” the USFA presciently observed that “for both the fire/EMS services 
and law enforcement... the line between the two has been relatively distinct: the fire 
service prevented and extinguished fires, and police agencies prevented crime and 
arrested offenders” (p. 30).  Despite the recommendations of the USFA more than ten 
years ago, powerful political forces continue to push back against needed innovation. 
Influential lobby’s such as the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) 
and the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) strongly oppose formalized 
consolidation of police and fire services, and recently joined forces to produce an 
informational publication to assist fire departments in resisting such efforts (IAFC & 
IAFF, 2009). In opposing consolidation, the IAFC & IAFF (2009) cite numerous 
undesirable consequences, including low morale, inadequate training, loss of emphasis on 
fire safety programming, and overall deterioration of professionalism in the delivery of 
fire services. In addition, the IAFC places emphasis on the need for teamwork, which it 
correctly contrasts against the “police emphasis on individual action” (p. 5).  
In general, the police and fire cultures value teamwork differently. This thesis has 
highlighted this important cultural difference and has identified its primary corollary: that 
of over convergence and all associated problems. The claim that “Individual action on a 
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fire or EMS scene leads to unsafe acts, inefficiency and chaos, which too often has fatal 
consequences” is correct, and the only antidote is the development of a team culture—if 
only situational—within law enforcement (IAFC & IAFF, 2009, p. 5). Whether through 
formalized consolidation or informal partnerships, tactical integration cannot be achieved 
unless and until law enforcement resolves this pressing issue. 
Nevertheless, while some of the arguments opposing consolidation seem to have 
merit, over-politicization of the issue threatens to cloud legitimate areas of concern and to 
block important efforts at innovation. The National Fire Prevention Association, for 
example, is concerned that in consolidation, “the fire department suffers more than the 
police department” (IAFC & IAFF, 2009, p. 5).  This type of commentary may reveal 
protectionist motivations which can only serve to obscure the need to innovate the 
changes necessary to save lives.  
Those who have written in support of formalized consolidation point to improved 
command and control, efficiency of response, and cost savings, with some reference to 
tactical integration in support of the growing homeland security mission (Mata, 2010; 
Matarese, Chelst, Fisher-Stewart, & Pearsall, 2007; Stinchcomb & Ordaz, 2007).  
However, there does not appear to be a simple answer for what is clearly a complex 
proposition. Writing on opposite sides of the issue, Mata (2010) and the IAFC/IAFF 
(2009) agree that of numerous agencies that have attempted formal consolidation, a 
significant number abandoned the concept and returned to traditional organizational 
structures. While it appears that formal consolidation has been a good fit for some 
communities, it is also clear that the concept is not a panacea. Thus, consolidation alone 
is unlikely to be either a necessary or sufficient means to ensure effective cross-
disciplinary tactical integration, but the debate serves to illuminate several important 
issues central to this thesis. 
First, administrative and functional consolidation of police, fire, and medical 
resources has long been seen as a goal worthy of experimentation, but tactical-integration 
of these disciplines becomes critical in the context of paramilitary terrorism. 
Organizational paradigms that exclude fire and medical personnel from hot zone 
operations are naïve and will not stand up to the test of a Mumbai or Beslan visited upon 
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the United States.  Given the current threat environment, American firefighters and 
medical personnel can no more expect to “hold short”26 from such an attack than police 
first responders can expect to wait outside during an active shooter incident. Second, 
while it is clear that the future will demand more of our first first responders than ever 
before, efforts to alter existing police-fire-medical tactical paradigms in order to better 
prepare for paramilitary terrorism are at risk of becoming casualties in a highly 
politicized war to derail formal consolidation.  
With organizations as powerful and respected as the IAFC and IAFF and “many 
other national organizations” opposed to consolidation and actively encouraging fire 
unions to resist such efforts (IAFC & IAFF, 2009, pp. 2–5), improved tactical-level 
integration may be seen as weakening the argument. Such lack of foresight, should it 
prevail, could prove catastrophic to our front-line first responders.   
B. THE NEED FOR TACTICAL-LEVEL INTEGRATION: THE URGENT 
LESSONS OF COLUMBINE AND MUMBAI  
Interdisciplinary operational challenges were abundant at Columbine, and can be 
seen as a foreshadowing of what responders will face in the event of a paramilitary attack 
against targets in the homeland.  Numerous problems at Columbine spurred the USFA 
emphasis on police/fire/EMS tactical integration: 
• Police required the use of a fire engine as a shield in order to position 
themselves for entry into the school; this necessitated the driver of the fire 
engine to provide a police officer with “an impromptu course in driving 
the fire apparatus”; medical and other equipment was removed from the 
truck, and fire crew members were reassigned other duties (USFA, 1999, 
p. 15).  The truck was later abandoned by SWAT after becoming stuck in 
soft ground near the west doors. (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 17). 
• When SWAT officers reported a potential fire and explosion hazard inside 
the school and it appeared that “fire suppression resources might be 
needed,” an ad hoc “fire task force was established” that “began 
formulating plans to combat a fire-related emergency, working closely  
 
                                                 
26 This terminology is common among police and firefighters and is used to describe fire/ medical 
service policies, which preclude operation of personnel in areas of ongoing police tactical operations.  
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with law enforcement personnel” (USFA, 1999, p. 18). The fire hazard 
was quickly discounted, and the plan was abandoned before the team 
could form and deploy. 
• A fire rescue unit was “ordered to locate at the east doors of the school at 
the request of SWAT officers” to await SWAT team extrication of a 
victim “since it was unsafe for the paramedics to enter the building” 
(USFA, 1999, p. 20).  To be sure, exclusion of fire personnel from areas of 
ongoing violent confrontation has not been unilaterally imposed by police. 
Many fire departments today, including Seattle Fire Department, have 
procedures that prohibit personnel from entering such active areas, and 
this problem was well documented among fire and medical personnel at 
Columbine (Seattle FD, 2009; Rosegrant, 2001a, pp. 17–18).  
• It was not until four hours after the attack started that “SWAT officers 
cleared fire department personnel to enter the building and shut off the 
school’s fire alarm and main sprinkler system…Many explosive and 
incendiary devices remained in place, and hundreds of backpacks that had 
to be checked for explosives were still inside the building” (USFA, 1999, 
p. 22; Rosegrant, 2001a, Rosegrant, 2009b). These examples teach us that 
tactical inefficiencies cost time, and we know that during an active shooter 
event, the “stopwatch of death” is ticking, and minutes can mean the loss 
of innocent lives (Fretz, 2007a).  In a Mumbai style attack, the kill rate 
will increase beyond anything yet experienced in the U.S., far exceeding 
even that achieved at Virginia Tech (Fretz, 2007a, p. 2); this means that 
the price tag in lives of tactical inadequacy can also be expected to 
increase dramatically.  Furthermore, cross-disciplinary tactical 
inefficiencies can continue to cost lives even after attackers cease to be a 
direct threat. 
First responders outside Columbine High could not have known that Harris and 
Klebold had likely committed suicide even before the first SWAT teams attempted entry 
(USFA, 1999; Rosegrant, 2001a, Rosegrant, 2001b). Nevertheless, SWAT teams moved 
very slowly through the school as they attempted to locate suspects and victims, and to 
navigate among numerous explosive devices which had been placed throughout the 
buildings. As previously discussed, it would be hours before SWAT teams could reach 
the library, where many student victims were located with the shooters, who had been 
dead since before or shortly after the teams made entry (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 12). 
Meanwhile, teacher Dave Sanders, and perhaps others severely injured, waited inside for 
help. 
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Sanders was not located by SWAT teams for two and a half hours after he was 
shot; however, confusion and miscommunication between police and fire-medical 
personnel created an additional delay in completing his medical evacuation from the 
school (Rosegrant, 2001b, p. 4). After locating Sanders at 2:42 pm, a SWAT team 
member was assigned to wait with him pending arrival of paramedics; paramedics, 
however, waited outside the east entrance, expecting the victim to be carried out by 
police.  The result was another 20–30 minute delay in transporting Sanders to a nearby 
triage location which had been set up just outside the same east side entrance (Rosegrant, 
2001a, pp. 26–27). Sanders died of his injuries.27 
Operational plans anticipating such challenges should be formulated and 
exercised prior to, not during our response to critical incidents.  When faced with 
multiple, simultaneous attacks, many cross-discipline operations, including firefighting, 
downed officer/ citizen rescue, and explosives disposal will need to occur concurrently 
with ongoing law enforcement tactical operations. Paramilitary terrorism demands that 
we envision—well in advance—teams comprised of police, fire, and medical personnel 
acting jointly to conduct combat assault, firefighting, explosives ordnance mitigation, and 
rescue operations. Many of those subjected to the horrors of Columbine carried away an 
understanding of this fact and took steps, at the local level, to put their newly gained 
insights into action.   
Area police and fire agencies recognized the importance of combined police-
bomb squad tactical operations; “Had bomb experts deployed with...[the] SWAT team,” 
they would have been able to inform SWAT that most of the 76 devices (Rosegrant, 
2001a, p. 30) they would encounter inside the school were safe as long as they were not 
moved (Rosegrant, 2001b, p. 8).  As it was, the presence of so many devices represented 
an unknown threat which greatly slowed the progress of SWAT entry teams. 
                                                 
27 Although not much is publicly known about the response of the LAPD fire services during the 
North Hollywood event, we know there were communication and coordination problems. Describing a 
situation eerily reminiscent of Columbine, the Los Angeles Times reported that one of the two suspects 
may have bled to death unnecessarily as a result of miscommunications between police and fire personnel 
(Berry & Glover, 1998).  
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Sluggishness of tactical response costs lives (Armellino, 2007; French, 2010; Fretz, 
2007a; Giduck, 2005; Rosegrant, 2001a, Rosegrant, 2001b; U.S. Marine Corps, 1996).28   
The message of the Columbine veterans was the same regarding police-medical 
tactical operations: following Columbine, the Littleton fire department trained 15 
paramedics as “special SWAT paramedics who could deploy along with a tactical team” 
(Rosegrant, 2001b, p. 8). Fire and medical services personnel in Mumbai, faced with a far 
more dynamic and overwhelming series of events, and while not specifically trained to 
operate in support of police tactical operations, worked alongside police in the kill zones. 
The lessons of Mumbai represent a critical chapter to be added to the collective American 
experiences of Columbine and North Hollywood. Fire service personnel in Mumbai, 
faced with the prospect of people trapped, injured, and dying inside the Taj Mahal Hotel 
and at other attack locations, chose to act immediately; we can be sure that firefighters in 
the U.S. will do the same.  
A.V. Sawant, Chief Fire Officer, said, “There were some pretty scary moments 
while we were fighting fires at the Taj Hotel. On Thursday night when we were in a cage 
trying to rescue guests, we saw one of the terrorists carrying a gun” (India Express, 
2009).  Thought not specifically trained to do so, Indian firefighters provided downed-
officer rescue and other specialized services while operating in the kill zone (Amrohvi, 
2008; India Express, 2008).  Mumbai fire and emergency medical personnel risked their 
lives in the line of fire, moving “about with the work, at times even coming under heavy 
gunfire and grenade attack” (India Express, 2008).   
Raju, an ambulance worker, said that while attempting to rescue injured persons 
“a grenade exploded right in front of our ambulance, shattering the windshield” (India 
Express, 2008). Ambulance personnel “ran in and out with stretchers carrying the 
wounded—each time not knowing if they will make it back themselves to the 
ambulance” (Mathew, 2010, p. 9).  At one point, emergency medical personnel were  
 
                                                 
28 By 2004, 14 lawsuits based on negligence, wrongful death, and personal injury had been settled by 
entities involved in the Columbine response; many of the suits alleged that law enforcement had been too 
“risk averse” and had failed to “respond aggressively enough” (Rosegrant, 2001b, pp. .3–5). 
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provided with bullet proof vests and tasked with evacuating injured officers; Mohammad 
Sheikh, a medic, said, “shots were fired at us and the commandos retaliated. Luckily, we 
rushed out with the injured officer” (India Express, 2008). 
American firefighters and medical personnel will have to do the same; now is the 
time to acknowledge this eventuality and to prepare for it.  Confronted with the threat of 
paramilitary terrorism, American police, fire, and medical disciplines must begin to truly 
embrace the concept of “joint operations” long ago envisioned by the USFA (1999, p. 
30). Has the message truly come home to the American first responder community as a 
whole? 
C. BEYOND COLUMBINE: TEN YEARS AFTER 
The current construct of unified command, an essential component of the National 
Incident Management System first published in 2004, does not appear to envision actual 
unification of line response functions (NIMS, 2004).  As defined within NIMS, 2004, a 
unified command permits multiple agencies to work together without “affecting 
individual agency authority, responsibility, or accountability” (p. 12).  Indeed, this 
language appears designed to protect individual agency sovereignty, perhaps as a way of 
encouraging interagency cooperation and participation in NIMS.  While I do not argue 
that the responsibility for innovating response-level tactical integration should reside with 
the federal government, such considerations should not be ignored by NIMS.   
Tallen (2008) observed that of the large body of increasingly sophisticated official 
doctrine that has appeared since 2001, “They are quite consistent in ignoring modalities 
of terrorist attack other than WMD, isolated IEDs, and suicide terrorism” (p. 3). Tallen 
(2008) further observes that both the National Response Framework (which includes 
NIMS) and the National Response Scenarios are designed for “consequence 
management,” and give no attention to “resolution of an ongoing terrorist incident” (p. 3).  
While this thesis does not advocate formalized consolidation of police-fire-medical 
services, one issue seems crystal clear: A failure to focus on tactical-level integration of 
police-fire-medical first responders during extreme and novel events will ensure 
unnecessary loss of life in the future. Sluggishness of tactical response, delays in medical 
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evacuation and treatment, and degraded ability to address explosives mitigation and 
firefighting during ongoing tactical operations are vulnerabilities we are aware of and can 
begin to mitigate.  Officials in Mumbai prior to 26–11 had an understanding of the 




Those who claim to lead emergency first responders in the United States have a 
duty to acknowledge the evolving threat of paramilitary terrorism and to recognize its 
ramifications for current doctrine affecting training, tactics, and procedures. If indeed 
“Beslan was little more than a dry run of operations they intend to soon be running on 
American soil, against American targets, American children” (Giduck, 2005, p. 375) and 
Mumbai was the coming “urban jihad” (TOSIR, 2009, p. 8), then we must ensure that we 
are not merely doing things right, but that we are doing the right things. This will entail 
asking some tough questions of ourselves and of our organizations. This thesis has 
attempted to begin the process of asking some of those questions. 
Quite clearly, the answer to the primary research question addressed in this 
analysis, Will it suffice for American first responders to simply respond in a manner that 
we “usually respond to a law and order situation” when faced with acts of paramilitary 
terrorism in the homeland?, is a resounding “No.”  Following the 1999 attacks against 
Columbine High School, it was no longer even acceptable for U.S. law enforcement to 
respond to active shooter incidents as we had “usually” responded to “law and order 
situations.” Radical changes swept away tactical paradigms in existence at the time and 
represented a watershed event in policing in terms of the collapse of the isolate-contain-
call model, which had been proven to be inadequate and indefensible under the extreme 
and novel conditions produced with the emergence of the active shooter phenomenon.  
The threat of paramilitary terrorism has once again radically altered the environment in 
which American police officers—indeed, all first responders—must be prepared to 
operate. 
The sudden emergence of the active shooter phenomenon had a rather profound 
impact, but only on a select group of emergency first responders: local police patrol 
officers. SWAT tactics remained substantially unchanged; there was no overall 
measurable effect on fire or medical first responder tactics, and the federal government 
barely noticed the watershed event endured by average police patrol officers everywhere 
 64
in the United States.  Paramilitary terrorism, particularly if manifested in the form of 
Mumbai style multiple attacks against highly vulnerable soft targets, will make the 
tactical transformation among the members of the U.S. first-responder community 
complete.  
American domestic SWAT teams have never experienced and do not train to 
confront the combat-like tactics which paramilitaries have employed in Mumbai and 
elsewhere and will employ in the United States if the opportunity is presented. American 
fire and medical services cannot expect to—indeed, many will refuse to—“hold short” in 
the shadow of an extended, ongoing multi-assault scenario such as occurred in Mumbai. 
Our fire and medical counterparts in Mumbai chose to operate in hot zones, and our 
firefighters and paramedics in the U.S. would no doubt do the same.  Thus, “responding 
as we usually do,” will simply not be an option—for any American emergency response 
discipline—under such conditions. Yes, the time has indeed come—yet again—for 
American first responders to seriously question existing tactical paradigms. All levels of 
government and all disciplines charged with emergency response must innovate in the 
face of a changing threat environment.  Given the nature and organization of American 
domestic emergency response and preparedness activities, this thesis suggests that the 
federal government does indeed have an important leadership role to fill in this process of 
change.  
Asking American first responders to rely exclusively on NIMS/ICS in its current 
form is to risk focusing them on the “delusion” that they “can truly be in control of the 
enemy or the situation” (USMC, 1996, p. 43). This thesis has highlighted the challenges 
that will be involved in attempting to establish centralized command and control in the 
first critical minutes or hours following the initiation of extreme and novel crisis events, 
especially acts paramilitary terrorism. The Marine Corps believes that “We should accept 
that the proper object of command and control is not to be thoroughly and precisely in 
control” (USMC, 1996, p. 43).  As Undersheriff Dunaway, Jefferson County Sherriff’s 
Department, has said, “I don’t think incident command was ever intended to be used for 
combat operations and that is basically what we were dealing with” (Rosegrant, 2001a, p. 
15). If not NIMS, then what? 
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While command and control, including the version prescribed within NIMS 
doctrine, is a critically important component of crisis response, NIMS does not currently 
answer the question: How should first responders—law enforcement as well as fire and 
medical services—plan to respond when facing multiple Fidayeen (high-risk 
commandos) attacking multiple locations with unimaginable determination and ferocity?  
If NIMS/ICS is unable to define or manage the nature and parameters of the initial law 
enforcement response to an extreme and novel event, or to stimulate the type of 
preparation and training that law enforcement (indeed, that all first responders) will 
require in such cases, then it follows that more than NIMS—or a reengineered NIMS—is 
needed.  This is not to suggest that local first responders are victimized by a bureaucratic 
and unresponsive national government.  Local law enforcement, for example, must first 
clean its own house, so to speak, before the federal government (or, for that matter, other 
local emergency response disciplines) can be seriously expected to involve themselves in 
building a new, highly integrated tactical response doctrine. 
Before American law enforcement can begin to seriously confront issues such as 
over-reliance on specialized tactical teams and cross-disciplinary tactical integration of 
police-fire-medical services, the problem of over-convergence must be resolved. In the 
case of a well-planned paramilitary terrorist attack, there are likely to be others involved 
who are not directly associated with the primary attack location, including those 
conducting surveillance, planning to execute secondary attacks against first responders, 
or preparing to execute additional simultaneous attacks on other targets (Giduck, 2005). 
According to Giduck (2005), “In Israel this is a foregone conclusion. As soon as tactical 
units receive word of a terrorist assault, a number of the responding teams do not go 
anywhere near the site of the attack at all” (p. 341).  Precisely this mindset must become 
part of a new American doctrinal mantra. Unmanaged law enforcement assets over-
converging en masse at major incident locations defy and impede the potential benefits to 
be gained through command and control mechanisms such as NIMS and create unsafe 
conditions into which fire and medical personnel correctly refuse to be drawn. 
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Before law enforcement may legitimately demand support from the federal 
government to build a more flexible, adaptable NIMS—one that is particularly well-
suited to its own needs during the initial response stages of extreme and novel events—
law enforcement must first learn to effectively manage its own assets.  Still, a nationally 
led effort is needed in the Unites States to seriously explore the readiness and capabilities 
of U.S. police forces, fire services, and emergency medical personnel to respond and 
perform well during the very early stages of extreme and novel crises, such as multiple, 
simultaneous acts of paramilitary terrorism.  Together we must design the training and 
tactics needed to supplement NIMS, so that our first responders, operating under extreme 
conditions in the absence of effective communications, may act jointly and effectively to 
respond to any type of threat, including that of paramilitary terrorism. This thesis 
suggests that the federal government should expand the National Response Framework to 
include training aimed at improving response capabilities to multiple, simultaneous, 
ongoing terrorist incidents.  
This will mean supplementing NIMS to include training scenarios that go beyond 
consequence management to support innovative response-focused, grass-roots, 
immediate rapid deployment programs, such as MACTAC, and acknowledging the 
limitations of current tactical doctrine, which may not properly prepare domestic SWAT 
teams for the combat-like eventuality of paramilitary terrorism. We must continue to 
confront the issue of exclusive or over reliance on specialized teams, which may create 
unacceptable delays in response, and which, more importantly, may delay or preclude the 
provision of proper training to our first first responders. These will be the police officers, 
firefighters, and medical personnel who will be required to act safely, effectively, and 
immediately if they are to save lives, including their own. 
Finally, as programs like MACTAC continue to evolve, fire and medical 
responders will need to be included.  As has been demonstrated, non-law enforcement 
first responders will also be faced with significant paradigm shifts; ideas of combat 
firefighting and rescue may seem foreign to many, and are sure to draw resistance from 
political lobbies, including collective bargaining and other national associations.  The 
reality, however, is that firefighters, medical personnel, and police officers, faced with a 
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Mumbai style paramilitary terrorist attack, will have no alternative but to work together 
in the kill zone.  Columbine, an event hardly comparable to 26–11, taught us that such 
preparations cannot take place in the midst of ongoing tactical operations but require 
advance planning and training. Given what we now know about potential paramilitary 
terrorist operations, our new mandate demands we overcome egocentric, legal, and 
political barriers and begin the necessary planning sooner rather than later. 
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APPENDIX A.  MUMBAI REVISITED: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
GROUND ZERO 
There is a temptation—perhaps in part because it brings us relief or reassurance—
to allow our thinking about Mumbai to be negatively influenced by her status as a capital 
city of the third world. This is a type of cognitive bias that makes it easier for us to ignore 
her problems, the story of her people and their experiences, and the important lessons she 
stands ready and willing to share. In limiting our thinking this way, we relegate the city, 
her home state of Maharashtra, and her people—including many thousands of police 
officers, firefighters, and others—to a kind of political and socio-economic nether land.   
Before travelling to Mumbai in December 2009, such biases colored my own 
thinking, leaving me tempted to pretend that my own society and culture were somehow 
immune to events such as those of 26–11.  There can be no surer cure for such cognitive 
errors than to stand with the people of Mumbai—the leaders and officers of the Mumbai 
police, and others—atop 26–11’s own ground zero.  In order to fully appreciate and 
understand the significance of what occurred in Mumbai, it is first necessary to see and 
understand the story of her people, culture, and institutions. We are far more alike than 
we are different. 
As may be apparent from the literature review, much of what is suggested in this 
thesis builds upon the lessons of Mumbai and attempts to apply them to American public 
safety systems and tactics. This thesis suggests that the story of Mumbai and her people 
has something to teach us. Thus, because this thesis has presented ideas that, partly on 
this basis, call into question various aspects of collective American emergency response 
dogma, the reader deserves a brief introduction to the stories of some of the people of 
Mumbai. 
Men like Raj Khilnani, Additional Director General of Police (Addl.DG), 
Railways; K.P. Raghuvanshi, Addl.DG, Anti-terrorism; Himanshu Roy, Joint 
Commissioner (Jt.CP), Law and Order, Mumbai Police, and many others personify an 
unmistakably universal law enforcement spirit. It was this spirit that compelled their 
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personal friends, close associates, and fellow Mumbai police officers to resist—in some 
cases to the death—against the attackers of 26–11.  For these men and many others like 
them, the attacks of 26–11 are as much about personal tragedy as they are about the 
academic complexities of international terrorism.  This chapter is dedicated to telling one 
small part of their story. 
A. INDIAN POLICE SERVICE AND MUMBAI POLICE: ORGANIZATION, 
RANK STRUCTURE, BACKGROUND 
The central government of India recruits, selects, and trains all candidates for 
positions within the Indian Police Service (IPS), which is a national entity administered 
through the Ministry of Home Affairs (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, n.d., pp. 
36, 40–41). All senior officer positions in policing throughout India are filled by IPS 
officers, which collectively form a kind of elite officer corp. After completion of 
foundational training in conjunction with other “all India”29 services personnel, 
candidates are assigned to a 44-week basic IPS officer school at the National Police 
Academy in Hyderabad (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, n.d., p. 36).  Upon 
successful completion of training, IPS officers are allotted to a state cadre, such as 
Maharashtra, and are assigned two years probationary status as assistant superintendents 
of police (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, n.d., p. 41). Probationary officers 
attend additional training at state police academies and other schools as may be required 
by the various states to which they are assigned. 
IPS officers thus form an elite officer corps, which can be compared to the officer 
corps of the United States military. Though assigned and administered within the 
organizational and command structure of a given state, IPS officers can be removed from 
service only by action of the central government.  The chief IPS officer for a state holds 
the rank of Director General of Police.  Through a “commisionerate system,” the IPS 
provides senior officers for service in metropolitan areas such as Mumbai 
(Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, n.d., p. 14). In Mumbai, the commissioner of 
                                                 
29 There are two “all India” services provided by the central government: the Indian Police Service 
(IPS), and the Indian Administrative Services (IAS), formerly known as the Indian Civil Service 
(Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, n.d., pp. 40–41). 
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police (chief of police) holds the rank of Additional Director General (Addl.DG) in the 
IPS, reporting to the state Director General of police. Other major law enforcement 
entities within a state, such as the Railway Police, may also be led by IPS officers of the 
rank of Addl.DG; this is true in Mumbai, where the Railway Police chief, also an 
Addl.DG, is headquartered in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal (CST).   
Dual factors determine the rank and title to which IPS officers are referred: rank 
within the IPS, and the nature of their assignment (Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative, n.d.; Kamte, 2009; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009). For example, an IPS 
Addl.DG assigned through the commissionerate system may be the Police Commissioner, 
such as in Mumbai. At the state level, the rank immediately subordinate to Addl.DG is 
Inspector General (IG), referred to at the level of the commissionerate as Joint 
Commissioner of police (Jt.CP). Subordinate to the Jt.CP is the Additional Commissioner 
of Police (Addl.CP), known at the state level as Deputy Inspector General (DIG).  Thus, 
the IPS includes ranks ranging from assistant superintendent through director general, but 
comprises less than one percent of the entire police forces of India (Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative, n.d., p. 29). The enlisted equivalent in Indian policing enters at 
the rank of police constable and may promote to the maximum rank of inspector; these 
ranks comprise more than 99 percent of all police personnel in India, and are recruited, 
trained, and assigned by the individual states (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 
n.d., pp. 30–33).  
There are approximately “40,000 odd policemen” in Mumbai City; “nearly 
16,000/17,000 are for special duties like security, traffic, special branches, etc. leaving 
only 24,000 men for normal police station duties” (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 
61).  Covering two shifts and accounting for sick leave, vacation, etc., there are 
approximately 10,000 police officers assigned to stations in Mumbai at any given time; 
these officers are distributed among 20 stations citywide (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, 
p. 61).  Using the 24,000 officer figure for approximately 19,000,000 people living in the 
greater Mumbai area (City Mayors, 2007; Morris, 2007; Population Reference Bureau, 
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2007),30 Mumbai fields few officers per 1000 residents compared to modern law 
enforcement agencies in the United States.31 Officers assigned to such stations, many 
equipped with only cane or bamboo sticks, were the first to respond to initial reports of 
gunfire and explosions on 26–11.  Despite reports to the contrary,32 many Mumbai police 
officers of all ranks did in-fact engage the terrorists directly, and in doing so, prevented 
an even higher death toll. 
B. TO THE LAST BULLET: THE STORY OF ADDITIONAL 
COMMISSIONER ASHOK KAMTE AND OTHER HEROES OF 26–11 
1. Police Action at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal and Cama Hospital 
Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab, 22, son of Mohammad Amir Kasab, Faridkot, 
District Okara, Province of Punjab, Pakistan, and his teammate, mission leader Ismail 
Khan, 25, of Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Pakistan, murdered Hemant Karkare, 
Joint Commissioner of Police (Jt.CP), Anti-terrorism, Ashok Kamte, Additional 
Commissioner of Police (Addl.CP), Mumbai East Region, and 12 other policemen in the 
Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminal (CST) and Cama-Chowpatty sector on 26–11 (Government 
                                                 
30 Mumbai is consistently ranked as one of the largest cities in the world, particularly when using 
figures for population density; population figures are available for the city itself, as well as for the Greater 
Mumbai urban agglomeration (UA), and range from 15-20,000,000 depending on the source and 
geographical area represented. I have used the UA figure provided by the Population Reference Bureau, 
since the Mumbai police are responsible for the greater Mumbai region. 
31 The Las Vegas Metro Police Department currently enjoys a ratio of 1.94 officers per 1000 and 
aspires to a goal of 2.0 officers per 1000, which is considered to be consistent with other large agencies in 
the U.S; for a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJA) brief indicating that for law enforcement agencies in the 







32 NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly has said that the attacks of 26–11 were successful in part because 
“the local police did not engage [emphasis added]” the attackers (SCHSGA, 2009a; Kelly section, p. 4). 
Media reports depicting confusion among first responders and reporting significant delays in countering the 
attack increased the perception that the Mumbai police did little to intervene against the terrorists.  This is 
the story of systemic and programmatic failure; it is not the story of numerous individual police officers, 
fire fighters, medical personnel, and others who bravely confronted and battled the attackers, and in too 
many cases, lost their lives in the process. 17 Mumbai and Railway police officers were killed and 35 
injured in the immediate fighting, which followed the initiation of the attacks (Pradhan & Balachandran, 
2009, Appendix 2). 
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of India, 2009, pp. 2–3; Pradhan & Balachandran,2009, p. 41). The number of police 
officers killed by Kasab and Khan in this sector represents an astounding 82 percent of all 
officers killed in Mumbai on 26–11.  
Kasab and Khan killed many more police officers at CST and vicinity, including 
the Cama & Albliss Hospital, than would die at all other attack locations combined 
(LVMPD, 2010; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 41; NYPD, 2008). The high death 
toll of police officers in this sector was due in part to the proximity of the attacks to the 
CST police station, which the terrorists reached and attacked at 2202 hours on 26–11 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 41). At CST, Police Inspector Shashank Shinde and 
Police Constables Shri Pandharkar and Armadas Pawar fought back using .303 rifles, and 
were quickly killed “while retaliating” in the face of overwhelming firepower (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, pp.  41-42).  The stout resistance of the CST police caused the 
terrorists to flee across an elevated pedestrian walkway that terminated into a lane, or 
alleyway, leading directly to the rear of Cama Hospital (Duraphe, 2009, p. 13; Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 42).  
Kasab and Khan had become “confused and lost, and after crossing back and forth 
several times over parked trains and platforms, found the walk bridge and left the station” 
(R. Khilnani, personal communication, December 2009)33. Injuring two more constables 
as they fled, Kasab and Khan made their way several hundred meters along the alleyway 
near the Times of India newspaper and entered the Cama Hospital compound via the rear 
wall. After killing two watchmen, they entered the hospital itself (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 42).  Once inside, the terrorists climbed to upper floors, just as 
others in their party would do at the Taj, Trident-Oberoi, and Nariman House (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 43).  
Meanwhile, Sadanand Date, Addl.CP, Mumbai Central Region, arrived at the 
front entrance to the hospital and, with a party of six police officers, made entry and 
pursued the attackers to the sixth floor (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 43). Moments 
later Date was severely injured and one of his officers killed in a vicious exchange of 
                                                 
33 The author visited ADG Khilnani at Chhatrapati Station during the week of December 7, 2009. 
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gunfire with Kasab and Khan. Date, using his revolver and a carbine from one of his 
injured officers, held his position, permitting several in his party to retreat (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 43).  One of Date’s officers, Sachin Tilekar, left the building and 
made contact with other officers gathering outside (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 
43).  The subsequent attempt to rescue the wounded Date would lead to more police 
fatalities and would quickly become a focus for controversy centering on the exercise of 
police leadership and command and control during the attacks (Kamte, 2009; Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009).  
Outside the hospital, Tilekar encountered numerous police officers, including two 
high-ranking and well-known figures within the Mumbai police, Jt.CP Hemant Karkare 
and Addl.CP Ashok Kamte, and informed them of the dire circumstances facing their 
injured colleague (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 43).  Karkare, highly respected, and 
the ranking IPS officer outside Cama that night, worked with Kamte to quickly devise a 
rescue plan; they selected Inspector Vijay Salaskar, veteran guerilla fighter, and three 
police constables, obtained a vehicle, and prepared to drive toward the Cama front 
entrance (Kamte, 2009; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009). Collectively possessing years of 
specialized training and experience, these three officers represented a formidable force. 
Jt.CP Himanshu Roy, when later asked about Kamte, said with as much reverence as 
sadness, “Yes, I knew him” (H. Roy, Additional Joint Commissioner, Indian Police 
Service, personal communication, December 8, 2009).  
In fact Roy and Kamte had enjoyed a friendship lasting many years (Kamte, 
2009). The two met as young men while attending St. Xavier’s College in Mumbai, at a 
time and place where Roy says, “no two persons could have been more dissimilar” 
(Kamte, 2009, p. 194).  Roy, a science student, described himself as more reserved in 
those days, while Kamte, he says, a liberal arts major, was outgoing and athletic; at that 
point in their lives, their relationship was nothing more than a “casual association” 
(Kamte, 2009, p. 194).  
“Destiny,” Roy says, brought them together again at the National Police Academy 
(NPA), Hyderabad, after which both were assigned to the Maharashtra state cadre 
(Kamte, 2009, p. 195). At the academy, they shared a room, which Roy says was “full of 
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Ashok, always;” besides the sports paraphernalia always strewn about the room, 
“weapons were his other love and he had a number of books on them” (Kamte, 2009, p. 
195). By the time they had reached “middle management of the IPS, we were brothers” 
(Kamte, 2009, p. 194).  Kamte, it seems, was somewhat larger than life.    
Kamte came from a family with an impressive history of police and military 
service. Kamte’s great grandfather had served with the British police in India from 1895–
1923, and his paternal grandfather, Narayanrao Marutirao (N.M.) Kamte, had been the 
first post-independence Inspector General of Police for Bombay State (Kamte, 2009).  
N.M. Kamte started his career with the British Police Force in 1923, at age 23; during his 
career, he held significant positions of rank and responsibility and studied abroad in the 
U.S. and Britain (Kamte, 2009, pp. 137–138).  Kamte’s father rose to the rank of Lt.Col. 
in the Indian Army, serving as an aid to the Army Chief of Staff and later as the Adjutant 
of the Indian Military Academy (Kamte, 2009, p. 157). Kamte was a natural athlete and 
seemed destined to carry on the family tradition of government service. 
By the age of 12, Kamte was excelling in sports; from best junior cricketer, 1976–
77, to state shot putt champion, national power lifting champion, and unarmed combat 
champion at the National Police Academy, 1989–90—he was a natural (Kamte, 2009, pp. 
177; 179; 185).  Kamte’s love of sports was equaled by his love of firearms, and his 
athletic ability and love of competition naturally included shooting (Kamte, 2009).  
Kamte was given his first gun by his father at age six; by the time he was serving in the 
IPS, he was driven by a desire to see, touch, and master every weapon obtained by the 
police service (Kamte, 2009, p. 198).   
The IPS recognized Kamte’s passion and expertise, and in 2005 he was appointed 
Deputy Inspector General, Special Security Training Center, city of Pune, near Mumbai 
(Kamte, 2009, p. 201).  Despite his leadership position, he personally participated in 
training with his men, learning every new skill he could from experts who taught at the 
center (Kamte, 2009, pp. 201–202). Dr. Deepak Rao, a guest trainer, recalled that Kamte 
would “train side by side with the officers, standing long hours in the scorching sun and 
shooting round after round” (Kamte, 2009, p. 202). His reputation for expertise with 
firearms always featured in his career; one week before 26–11 he had been tasked with 
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coordinating with Hong Kong police to train Mumbai officers in the use of “sophisticated 
weapons” (Kamte, 2009, p. 202). On November 26, 2008, in a deserted lane leading to 
the Cama hospital, Kamte would need all of his skills.    
Kamte maintained a high-level of proficiency with a variety of weapons, and had 
an AK47 close by at all times, including the night of 26–11 (Kamte, 2009, p. 12). As they 
prepared to drive to the front of Cama Hospital, Karkare and his team could not have 
known that Kasab and Khan had already descended the stairs and exited the hospital via 
the front doors. The six police officers piled into a Toyota Qualis, with Karkare, Kamte, 
and Salaskar in the front seat, the three constables in the rear, and drove along Rang 
Bhavan Lane toward the hospital front entrance (Kamte, 2009).  They did not know it, 
but the lane had already been the scene of significant terrorist action. At approximately 
1145 hours, Police Sub-Inspector Bapusaheb Dhurgude had confronted Kasab and Khan 
near the hospital front entrance, and “they shot him dead” (Kamte, 2009, p. 43; Pradhan 
& Balachandran, 2009). Maruti Phad witnessed the murder of Dhurgude and was nearly 
killed himself when the terrorists open fire on his vehicle, blowing off one of his fingers 
(Kamte, 2009, p. 43). Karkare and his team were unwittingly driving straight into the 
immediate aftermath of this bloody scene. 
Kasab and Khan evidently saw the vehicle approaching and hid in some bushes; 
according to statements later obtained from Constable Arun Jadhav (the only surviving 
officer), as well as from Kasab himself, one of the officers saw something suspicious and 
the Qualis screeched to a halt (Kamte, 2009; Mid DAY Infomedia, 2010; Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 44). A student hiding nearby described Kamte getting out of the 
front seat, “taking position and firing towards the bushes;” one suspect, later determined 
to be Kasab, was then seen “walking in a wayward manner…writhing in pain as he kept 
shaking one of his hands” (Kamte, 2009, p. 50).  Kasab reportedly said later, “One bullet 
hit my hand and my AK47 dropped down. I bent to pick it up when a second bullet hit me 
on the same hand… Ismail opened fire at the officers” until “firing from their side  
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stopped” (Hansa, R., 2010, p. 68; Mid DAY Infomedia, 2010).34 Kasab and Khan then 
approached the vehicle and threw out the bodies of the dead and dying police officers in 
the front seat (Kamte, 2009, pp. 31–33). 
As the two were preparing to hijack the Qualis, a cell phone belonging to a dead 
constable in the backseat began ringing; Kasab and Khan fired again into the rear of the 
vehicle; incredibly, Constable Arun Jadhav, still sitting with two other constables killed 
in the ambush, also survived this secondary assault (Kamte, 2009, pp 31–33). The two 
men drove away with Jadhav still alive in the vehicle, and with Kasab “shaking his hand 
all the time, writhing in pain” (Kamte, 2009, p. 33).  Jadhav, who lay injured and silent as 
Kasab and Khan commandeered the Qualis, observed as Kasab and Khan drove past the 
Metro Theatre complex, opening fire on people gathered outside, killing Police Constable 
Arun Chitte (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 44).  Following the shooting at the Metro 
Theatre, the two abandoned the Qualis, hijacked a second vehicle, and fled toward 
Nariman Point (Kamte, 2009, p. 33; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 44).  Jadav used 
his radio to relay suspect and vehicle information to the control room, and police set-up a 
roadblock near Girgaum Chowpatty (Duraphe, 2009, p. 14; Pradhan & Balachandran, 
2009, p. 44).   
Khan and Kasab drove directly into the police roadblock at Girgaum Chowpatty 
(Government of India, 2009; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009).  In an exchange of gunfire, 
Khan was killed by police, while Assistant Sub-Inspector Tukaram Ombale was killed as 
he attempted to overpower the injured Kasab; Ombale’s men, however, finished the job, 
and in the words of the widow Vinita Kamte (2009), the “bravery and courage showed by 
some officers…gave to the country the first fidayeen ever to be caught alive” (Duraphe, 
2009, p. 14; Government of India, 2009; Kamte, 2009, p. xiii; Pradhan & Balachandran, 
2009). With the death of Khan and the capture of Kasab, the attacks upon CST and Cama 
Hospital came to an end; however, the attacks on the Taj, Oberoi, and Nariman House 
                                                 
34 Kasab first confessed to his role in the attacks in December 2008, providing many details, including 
those attributed here. Kasab later recanted his confession, however, many of the details, particularly those 
pertaining to what occurred in front of Cama Hospital, are well-supported in statements provided by other 
eyewitnesses, including but not limited to the several cited in this thesis. Kasab later offered a second 
confession and was thereafter convicted in 2010 for his role in 26–11.  
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would drag on, finally ending after nearly 60 hours when commandos of the National 
Security Guards (NSG) killed the last terrorists inside the Taj Hotel (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 39).     
2. Police Action at Café Leopold and Taj Hotel 
The first report to reach the Mumbai police control room on November 26, logged 
at 2150 hours, was of gunfire at the Café Leopold.  Using data from various sources, it 
appears that Hafiz Arshad and “Naser” entered Café Leopold between 2130 and 2140 
hours, threw a grenade and opened fire on patrons (Government of India, 2009, p. 6; 
Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 36). Within seconds, 10 people were killed and 20 
injured. Officers in nearby police unit, “Tourist 1 Mobile,” arrived on scene almost 
immediately and came under fire in the alleyway as Arshad and Naser exited Leopold 
enroute to Taj; Tourist 1 reported by radio that “police driver was hit by bullet” (Pradhan 
& Balachandran, 2009, p. 31).  Numerous police officers from Colaba Station armed with 
“2 SLR35 and gas guns” had rushed to Leopold; however, by the time most of them 
arrived, the two attackers were gone, and may have already arrived at Taj (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 36).  As they fled Leopold, Arshad and Naser had deposited an 
IED composed of eight kg of RDX in their wake to cause further confusion and to delay 
pursuing officers (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 36).  Police Sub-Inspector Kakade 
covered the device with sandbags and called the bomb squad, which later safely diffused 
the IED (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 37).  
Within a few minutes of the first shots at the Leopold, shots were being reported 
at the Taj. The terrorists known as “Shoaib” and “Javed” had entered the Taj through the 
main entrance at about 2138 hours (approximately the same time Arshad and Naser had 
attacked Leopold), and killed an estimated 20 people within “the first few minutes” of 
launching their assault (Government of India, 2009, p. 7).  Taj Hotel security staff later 
explained that a mob of people had “attempted to rush into the hotel in panic when they 
learnt of the Leopold firing;” in the resulting confusion, Shoaib and Javed had most likely 
                                                 
35 SLR means self-loading rifle, which can be used interchangeably with the term semi-automatic rifle. 
These were likely 7.62mm variants on the AK47. 
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simply blended in with the crowds and were able to enter the Taj unmolested (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 39). After attacking Café Leopold, Arshad and Naser quickly 
rendezvoused with Shoaib and Javed at the Taj, entering through a side entrance with 
access to numerous high-end retail shops; together the four made their way to the historic 
Heritage Taj tower, killing anyone they happened to encounter (Government of India, 
2009, p. 7; Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 37).    
By 2155 hours, four to five police officers led by Deputy Commissioner of Police 
(DCP) Vishwas Patil, armed with only “one SLR, one .303” and an unspecified number 
of duty handguns entered the Taj in pursuit of the attackers, whose numbers had 
increased to four as a result of two attack teams linking up at the hotel (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, pp.31–32, 36).  The attackers had already killed numerous people in 
the coffee shop, around the swimming pool, and in front of the Heritage Tower elevators 
and attained the advantage of high ground by climbing the “royal staircase” of Taj 
Heritage (old) Tower, from which they could engage the approaching officers (Pradhan 
& Balachandran, 2009, p. 37). One of the suspects appeared to have been injured by 
police gunfire, while one officer, Police Constable Rahul Shinde, was killed by AK47 
gunfire (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 37). The terrorists continued to fire and drop 
grenades down on the officers, who, despite numerous bullet, shrapnel, and burn-related 
injuries and significant tactical disadvantages, continued to engage and play “hide-and-
seek” with the attackers for some four and one-half hours (Pradhan & Balachandran, 
2009, p.37). Marine commandos arrived at 0214 hours, November 27 (Pradhan & 
Balachandran, 2009, p. 37). 
3. Police Action at Trident-Oberoi 
Similar events were unfolding at the Trident-Oberoi Hotel. At approximately 
2155 hours, Police Inspector Shri Bhagwat Kacharu Bansode of Marine Drive Police 
Station entered the Trident in response to reports of explosions and gunfire; Bansode was 
armed with only a revolver (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 39).  By this time, all of 
the killing on the first floors of the two towers had already occurred; bodies were laying 
in and around the lobby, several restaurants, and the systems room; IEDs left in the valet 
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area outside Trident and near the Oberoi lobby would explode at 2215 and 2230 hours, 
respectively (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, pp. 39–40). Other officers arrived, and 
together they made their way across a lengthy passageway leading to the Oberoi, 
encountering more dead bodies along the way.36  Abdur Rehman and “Fahadulla” had 
acquired the high ground by ascending the Oberoi atrium, which was open to and 
overlooked the expansive lobby area below.  
From their vantage point, the attackers continued to fire and drop grenades on 
officers, who were unable to proceed further; the HLEC reported that even later arriving 
Naval Commandos were unable to proceed beyond this point for the same reasons 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 40). Police officers outside led by Addl.CP Parambir 
Singh, ATS, located vantage points from which they could target the attackers with 
sniper fire; together officers inside and outside Oberoi thus kept Fahadulla and Rehman 
pinned down while other police officers and firefighters continued to return fire and 
evacuate injured until the arrival of Naval Commandos at 0200 hours, November 27 
(Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, pp. 40–41).    
Similar events transpired simultaneously at Nariman House, where Babar Imran 
and “Nazir” planted two eight to 10kg IEDs of RDX, one at a nearby gas station, the 
other inside Nariman House near a staircase (Duraphe, 2009). Imran and Nazir executed 
or took hostage people they encountered and made their way to the high ground, from 
which they would stubbornly resist responding police officers. 
These were the actions of some of Mumbai’s first first responders, prompting the 
HLEC to conclude that “in general the Mumbai Police initially responded to multi-
targeted attacks efficiently, but in a manner that they usually respond to a law and order 
situation” (Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 10).  American police officers responding 
to a similar scenario will face similar challenges, and, if they survive, will have similar 
stories to tell. We are indeed more alike than we are different. 
 
                                                 
36 The Trident and Oberoi are separate towers, part of the same hotel complex; they are connected by a 
long narrow hallway.  
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APPENDIX B.  26–11 ATTACK TIMELINE37 
2120–40 Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan enter Chhatrapati Shivaji (CST); they 
make their way through the crowds and enter a public restroom 
2130–40 Hafiz Arshad and “Naser” attack Café Leopold  
2138 “Javed” and “Shoaib” blend in with panicked crowds rushing into Taj for 
safety and enter Taj Hotel main entrance 
2144 Kasab and Khan throw grenades and open fire inside CST 
2148  Control room notified of “foreigners” injured at Café Leopold 
2150 Mumbai police unit “Tourist 1 Mobile” reporting shots fired at officers 
outside Leopold; at least one officer injured 
2150–54 Arshad and Naser open fire in alley and drop an IED made of 8kg RDX 
in a nearby lane; they continue to Taj and enter a side entrance with access 
to high-end retail shops; within minutes they link up with Javed and 
Shoaib, and both teams enter the Heritage Tower   
2151 Mumbai Police Inspector Bansode is notified of shots fired at Trident-
Oberoi and arrives within minutes 
2154 Report of shots fired at Taj Hotel 
2155 DCP Nangre leads 4–5 police officers into Taj in pursuit of attackers 
 Inspector Bansode enters Trident and encounters numerous dead and 
injured in and around multiple restaurants, the lobby, and systems room; 
he and his entry team pursue Fahadulla and Abdur Rehman in the 
Oberoi atrium 
2156 IED explodes in taxi at Wadi Bunder 
Marine Drive Police and Addl.CP Police, South Region, report shots fired 
at Trident Oberoi 
2200 Addl.CP, Protection and Security, reports loud explosions coming from 
Trident-Oberoi 
 ACP Bagwan reports loud explosion in Colaba Wadi, near Nariman House 
2202 Kasab and Khan attacking area of CST police station 
 Main Control reporting unknown trouble near Nariman House 
2215 IED explodes in Trident-Oberoi valet area 
                                                 
37 Timeline constructed using various sources including Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009; Government 
of India, 2009, Mumbai Terror Attacks Dossier of Evidence: Section 1; Kamte, 2009; Duraphe, 2009.  
Source documents frequently disagree about times; where the disagreement is more than several minutes, 
available data have been used to create a time frame within which the event most likely occurred. 
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2217–25 Nariman House: Two IED’s of 8-10kg are planted, one at a gas station 
near Nariman House, the other inside the building near the bottom of the 
staircase; Babar Imran and “Nazir” begin firing outside Nariman 
2230 IED explodes near Trident-Oberoi lobby area 
2240 QRT and ATS teams arrive at Oberoi, but are unable to advance under 
heavy fire from Fahadulla and Abdur Rehman occupying upper atrium 
floors 
2253 IED explodes in taxi at Vile Parle  
2324 Addl.CP Kamte informs Main Control of firing and 3-4 grenade blasts 
occurring within 5 minutes inside Cama Hospital 
2328 Addl.CP Kamte notifies Main Control that ATS QRT are on scene at 
Cama; requests additional personnel to front of hospital 
2333–48 Jt.CP Karkare, Addl.CP Kamte, Inspector Salaskar, Police Constable Arun 
Jadhav, and two other constables ambushed near front of Cama hospital; 
Kamte returns fire, striking Kasab in hand; only Jadhav survives   
0025 Constable Jadhav begins informing Main Control of the ambush and 
activities of Kasab and Ismail, fleeing in hijacked vehicles 
0046 Taj Hotel: DCP Zone 1 repeatedly asking for reinforcements; police inside 
Taj are firing on attackers in different positions, but terrorists are throwing 
grenades; “we are losing lives”38 
November 27, 2008 
0200 Naval commandos arrive at Trident-Oberoi 
0214 Marine commandos arrive at Taj Hotel 
0730 NSG arrives at Taj Hotel 
November 29, 2008 
0800  Last of attackers are killed at Taj Hotel by commandos of the NSG 
                                                 
38 Pradhan & Balachandran, 2009, p. 37. 
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APPENDIX C.  KNOWN TERRORIST ATTACKERS OF 26–11 
(GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 2009)39 
Name Age Origin Target/Comments 
Arshad, Hafiz  23 Multan, Pakistan Leopold; Taj Hotel 
Fahadulla 23 Okara, Pakistan Trident-Oberoi 
Imran, Babar  25 Multan, Pakistan Nariman House 
Javed 22 Okara, Pakistan Taj Hotel 
Kasab, Ajmal  22 Punjab, Pakistan CST; Cama Hosp.; Captured 
alive 
Khan, Ismail  25 NWFP, Pakistan CST; Cama Hosp; Team leader
Naser 23 Faisalabad, Pakistan Leopold; Taj Hotel 
Nazir 28 Faisalabad, Pakistan Nariman House 
Rehman, Abdur  21 Arifwala, Pakistan Trident-Oberoi 
Shoaib 21 Sialkoat, Pakistan Taj Hotel 
 
                                                 
39 Individuals shown with only a single name had not been fully identified as of the time the dossier 
was prepared. 
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APPENDIX D.  MUMBAI & RAILWAY POLICE OFFICERS 
KILLED ON 26–11 (PRADHAN & BALACHANDRAN, 2009)40 
Name Rank Assignment Location Killed 
Bhosale, Balasaheb  Asst. Sub 
Inspector 
Mumbai Police Cama Hospital 
Chaudhari, Murlidhar  Unk Railway Police CST 
Chitte, Arun  Police 
Constable 
Traffic Metro Junction 
Dhurgude, Bapusaheb  Sub-Inspector Mumbai Police Xavier College/ 
Cama Hospital 
Jadav, Mukesh  Home Guard CST CST 
Kamte, Ashok  Addl.CP Mumbai Police East 
Region 
Cama Hospital 
Karkare, Hemant  Jt.CP Antiterrorism Squad Cama Hospital 
Khandekar, Madhukar  Police 
Constable 
Mumbai police Cama Hospital 
More, Prakash  Sub-Inspector Mumbai Police Cama 
Not Listed    
Ombale, Tukaram  Asst. 
Superintendent
Mumbai Police Girgaum Chowpatty
Patil, Jaywant  Police 
Constable 
Mumbai police Cama Hospital 
Patil, Yogesh  Police 
Constable 
Mumbai Police Cama Hospital 





Salaskar, Vijay  Inspector Crime Branch, 
Mumbai Police 
Cama Hospital 
Shinde, Rahul  Police 
Constable 
State Reserve Police 
Force 
Taj Hotel 
Shinde, Shashank  Inspector Railway Police CST 
 
                                                 
40 17 Mumbai and railway police officers were killed; however, the report of the HLEC appears to 
erroneously list Pawar twice. 
 86
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 87
LIST OF REFERENCES  




Armellino, R. (2007). When they come to kill the kids: The critical need for “immediate 
action rapid deployment” in school invasions. Retrieved March 30, 2010, from 
http://www.policeone.com/columnists_internal.asp?view=1271208&vid=1271209 
 
Arquilla, J. (2010). The new rules of war. Foreign Policy, March/April 2010 Retrieved 
February 2010, from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/the_new_rules_of_war? 
page=0,2   
 
Bardach, E. (2009). A practical guide for policy analysis (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: CQ 
Press.  
 
Bergen, P. (2008). Al Qaeda, the organization: A five year forecast. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618(1), 14–30.  
 
Bolgiano, D. (2009). Training America’s strategic corporals. Carlisle, PA: Strategy 
Research Project, U.S. Army War College.  
 
Borelli, F. (2005). Active shooter response training: A modern police necessity. Retrieved 
December 24, 2009, from http://www.poam.net/main/train-educate/active-
shooter-response-training.html  
 
Brenner, M. (2009). Letter from Mumbai: Anatomy of a siege. Vanity Fair (November), 
122–137.  
 
Buck, D. A., Trainor, J. E., & Aguirre, B. E. (2006). A critical evaluation of the incident 
command system and NIMS. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management, 3(3).  
 
Burton, F., & Stewart, S. (2009). Mitigating Mumbai. Stratfor Today, January 14, 2009. 
Retrieved October 2009, from 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090114_mitigating_mumbai  
 
City Mayors: Running the World’s Cities. (2007). The largest cities in the world by land 




CNN. (1997, February 28). Botched LA bank heist turns into bloody shootout. CNN. 
Retrieved January 2010, from http://www.cnn.com/US/9702/28/shootout.update/  
 
Coile, R. (1996). California's standardized emergency management system. American 
Society of Professional Emergency Planners Journal.  
 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. (n.d.). Police organization in India. New Delhi, 
India: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.  
 
Dawkins, R. (1989). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Duraphe, A. T. (2009). Final report Mumbai terror attack cases 26th November 2008. 
Mumbai, India: Government of India.  
 
Donahue, A. K., & Tuohy, R. V. (2006). Lessons we don’t learn: A study of the lessons 
of disasters, why we repeat them, and how we can learn from them. Homeland 
Security Affairs, 2(3).  
 
Dyer, C., McCoy, R. E., Rodriguez, J., & Van Duyn, D. N. (2007). Countering violent 
Islamic extremism: A Community responsibility. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 
76(12), 3–8.  
 
Fair, C. C. (2009). Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Laskar-e-Taiba 
(LeT) Attack Upon Several targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai; Before the 
House Homeland Security Committee: Subcommittee on Transportation Security 
and Infrastructure Protection. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.  
 
Franco, Z. E., Zumel, N., Holman, J., Blau, K., & Beutler, L. E. (2009). Evaluating the 
impact of improvisation on the incident command system: A modified single case 
study using the DDD simulator. Proceedings of the 6th International ISCRAM 
Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden.  
 
Freier, N. (2009). DoD leaders, strategists, and operators in an era of persistent 
unconventional challenge. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. 
 




Fresno Bee. (2010). Minkler shooter took his own life, police chief says. Retrieved 








Fretz, R. (2007b). The stopwatch death, Part II. Retrieved March 30, 2010, from 
http://www.policeone.com/active-shooter/articles/1356405/  
 
Ghetto. (n.d.). Quick read on the North Hollywood shootout. Message posted to 
http://www.fordpower.net/forums/showthread.php?t=129231  
 
Giduck, J. (2005). Terror at Beslan: A Russian tragedy with lessons for America's 
schools. Golden, CO: Archangel Group.  
 




Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem oriented policing. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
 
Government of India. (2009). Mumbai terror attacks dossier of evidence: Section 1. 
India: Government of India. Retrieved December 2009, from 
http://www.thehindu.com/nic/mumbaiattacksevidence-1.pdf  
 
Hagen, J. D. (2006). Interagency collaboration challenges among homeland security 
disciplines in urban areas. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA.  
 
Hansa, R. (2010). The Mumbai terror attacks: Need for a thorough investigation. In R. 
Puniyani & S. Hashmi (Eds.), Mumbai post 26/11: An alternative perspective (pp. 
64–79). New Delhi, India: SAGE.  
 
Harrald, J. R. (2006). Agility and discipline: Critical success factors for disaster response. 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1),, 
256–272, March 2006, 256–272.  
 
Hillyard, M. (2000). Public crisis management: How and why organizations work 
together to solve society's most threatening problems. Lincoln: Writer’s Club 
Press.  
 
House Committee on International Relations: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Terrorism and Nonproliferation and the Subcommittee on the 
Middle East and Central Asia. (2006). Hezbollah’s global reach. Retrieved June 
15, 2009, from http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/30143.pdf  
 
 90
Howitt, A. M. & Leonard Herman B. Dutch. (2005). A command system for all agencies? 
Crisis/Response, 1 (2)  
 
India Express. (November 29, 2008). Unnoticed heroes on Mumbai attacks: Fire fighters. 
India Express, Retrieved February 2010, from 
http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/392212/  
 
Interaction Systems Incorporated. (2009). Terrorism Open Source Intelligence Report 
(TOSIR) #374. Retrieved June 21, 2009, from 
http://www.indymarines.org/pages/tosir.htm  
 
International Association of Fire Chiefs & International Association of Fire Fighters. 
(2009). Police and fire consolidation: An ineffective use of resources. Fairfax, 
VA.: authors. Retrieved February 2010, from 
http://www.iafc.org/associations/4685/files/ leadrshp_ IAFFiafcPSOmanual.pdf  
 
Jenkins, B. M., Crenshaw, M., Schmid, A. P., Weinberg, L., Ganor, B., Gorriti, G. & 
Gunaratna, R. (2007). Terrorism: What’s coming the mutating threat. Oklahoma 
City, OK: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.  
 
Johnson, J. (March 2, 1997). Gunfight fuels debate over police weapons. Los Angeles 






Kamte, V. (2009). To the last bullet. Pune, India: Ulhas Latkar, Ameya Prakashan.  
 
Kelling, G. F. & Coles, C. M. (1996). Fixing broken windows: Restoring order and 
reducing crime in our communities. New York: Touchstone. 
 
Kettl, D. F. (2006). Is the worst yet to come? The annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 604 (1), 273–287.  
 
Klein, G. (1999). Sources of power: How people make decisions. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
Krulak, C. C. (1999). The strategic corporal: Leadership in the three-block war. 







Lait, M. (January 16, 1998). LAPD has yet to deploy assault rifles it urgently requested. 






Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. (n.d.a). Computer assisted dispatch system. 
Unpublished manuscript.  
 
Los Angeles Police Department. (n.d.b). LAPD online. Retrieved February 12, 2010, 
from http://www.lapdonline.org/ 
 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. (2010). Mumbai terrorist attacks 
(26/11/2008): Implications for major cities. Las Vegas, NV: Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department.  
 
Leedy, P. D. & Ormrod, J. E. (2005). Practical research: Planning and design (8th ed.). 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc.  
 
Los Angeles Police Department. (2009). Chief's message April 2009. Retrieved 
December 24, 2009, from http://lapdblog.typepad.com/lapd_blog/2009/04/chiefs-
message-april-2009.html  
 
Magnier, M. (2009, November 26). The World: Added security fails to comfort Mumbai: 
A year after terrorist attacks that killed 166, observers say the measures fall far 




Mata, V. R. (2010). The contribution of police and fire consolidation to the homeland 
security mission. Monterey, CA: Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.  
 
Matarese, L., Chelst, K., Fisher-Stewart, G., & Pearsall, A. (2007). Public safety concept 
in the post-9/11 world. Public Management, 89(4), 14–17.  
 
Mathew, B. (2010). As the fires die: The terror of the aftermath. In R. Puniyani, & S. 
Hashmi (Eds.) Mumbai post 26/11: An alternative perspective (pp. 8–15). New 
Delhi, India: SAGE. 
 










Mills, S. J. (1997). Military operations in urban terrain: A future perspective for a joint 
environment. Master’s thesis, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.  
 
Moody, T. J., & Bellavita, C. (2009). Locate, target, and destroy the attackers: Filling 
the gap between NIMS/ICS and the law enforcement initial response in the age of 




Morris, H. (2007). The world we live in. Planning (1727), 16–17.  
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 
Commission report: The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States. New York: W.W. Norton.  
 
National Incident Command System Integration Center. (2004). NIMS and the Incident 
Command System. Washington, DC: NIMS Integration Center. 
 
The National Response Team. (n.d.). Incident command system/ Unified Command 
(ICS/UC) Technical Assistance Document. Washington, DC: U.S. author. 
 
New York Police Department. (2008). Mumbai attack analysis. New York: author.  
 
Newton, J. & Schuster, B. (March 4, 1997). The North Hollywood shootout: LAPD 
commander turned holdup “bedlam” into Order; Crime: Royal Scott LaChasse 
wins praise for directing response, coordinating a flood of incoming officers. Los 








Overseas Security Advisory Council. (2008, December). Mumbai combined arms 




Palin, P. J. (2009). Strategic corporals and mission command. Message posted to 
http://www.hlswatch.com/2009/08/11/strategic-corporals-and-mission-command/  
 93
Pradhan, R. D., & Balachandran, V. (2009). Report of the High Level Enquiry Committee 
(HLEC) on 26–11 (No. Raasua.2008/C.R.34/29-A). Maharastra, India: 
Maharastra Government.  
 
Population Reference Bureau. (2007). Is Delhi India’s largest city? Retrieved May 1, 
2010, from http://www.prb.org/Articles/2007/delhi.aspx?p=1  
 
Quarantelli, E. L. (1999). The disaster recovery process: What we know and do not know 
from research. Preliminary Paper 286. Newark, NJ: Disaster Research Center, 
University of Delaware.  
 
Quarantelli, E. L. & Dynes, R. R. (1977). Response to social crises and disaster. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 3, 23–49.  
 
Rabasa, A., Blackwill, R. D., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Fair, C. C., Jackson, B. A., Jenkins, 
B. M., Jones, S. G., Shestak, N., & Tellis, A. (2009). The lessons of Mumbai. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.  
 
Robb, J. (2007). The coming urban terror. City Journal (summer). Retrieved November, 
2009, from http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_urban_terrorism.html  
 
Rosegrant, S. (2001a). The shootings at Columbine High School: The law enforcement 
response (No. C16–01–1612.0). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School of 
Government.  
 
Rosegrant, S. (2001b). The shootings at Columbine High School: Responding to a new 
kind of terrorism sequel (No. C16–01–1612.1). Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Kennedy School of Government.  
 
Schuster, B., & Smith, D. (March 1, 1997). The North Hollywood shootout: Gunfire, 
hostages and terror: 2 suspects slain, 10 officers injured in heist gone awry. Los 







Seattle Fire Department Response Guidelines. (2009). Seattle Fire Department operating 
guideline 4004. Seattle, WA: Seattle Fire Department.  
 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. (2009). Lessons 




Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. (2009). Lessons 




Shah, A. Afghans tighten security in Kabul after attack. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9598520  
 
Stinchcomb, J. B., & Ordaz, F. (2007). The integration of two “brotherhoods” into one 
organizational culture: A psycho-social perspective on merging police and fire 
services. Public Organization Review, 7, 143–161.  
 
Sullivan, J. P., & Elkus, A. (2009). Preventing another Mumbai: Building a police 
operational art. CTC Sentinel, 2(6), 4–7.  
 
Tallen, B. (2008). Paramilitary terrorism: A neglected threat. Homeland Security Affairs, 
4(2) Retrieved March 2010, from https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps41-
063008-05.pdf&code=9a8e53f94473063d88a14d57f08d1070  
 
Templeton, D. R. (2005). Assessing the utility of work team theory in a unified command 
environment at catastrophic incidents. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA.  
 
Trojanowicz, R. & Bucqueroux, B. (1990). Community policing: A contemporary 
perspective. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2003). Homeland security presidential 
directive/HSPD-5. Washington, DC: author.  
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2004a). National incident management system. 
Washington, DC: author.  
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2004b). National response plan. Washington, 
DC: author. 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2005). National planning scenarios. 
Washington, DC: author.  
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National response framework. 
Washington, DC: author.  
 
U.S. Fire Administration. (1999). Wanton violence at Columbine High School No. 
USFA–TR–128). Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Fire Administration. Retrieved February 
2010, from http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-128.pdf  
 
 95
U. S. Marine Corps. (1996). Command and control (No. MCDP 6). Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy.  
 
Virginia Tech Review Panel. (2007). Mass shootings at Virginia Tech April 16, 2007: 




Wenger, D., Quarantelli, E. L., & Dynes, R. R. (1990). Is the incident command system a 
plan for all seasons and emergency situations? Hazard Monthly, 10 (March), 8–
12.  
 
Yates, J. (1999). Improving the management of emergencies: Enhancing the ICS. 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management (Winter), 22–28.  
 96
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 97
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
 
